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A  UTHOR : 


PALMER,  JOHN 
CAMPBELL 


TITLE: 


PLEA  FOR  HEDONISM 


PLACE: 


WOOSTER 


DA  TE : 


[1 903] 


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"77  0  .^~ 
A  PLEA  FOB  HEDONISM 


A.  THESIS 


PRESENTED  BY 


John  C.  Palmer,  Jr.,  A.  M.,  Ph.  D., 


Wellsburg,  W.  V&. 


For  the  Degree  of  Doctor  of  Philosophy,  on  Examination,  in  Course  A,  Philosophy,  in 
the  Post-Qraduate  Department  of  the  University  of  Wooster, 

June,  1903. 


RepHnted  from  the  Post-Qraduate  and  Wooster  Quarterlp  for  July,  1903 


r 


Herald  Printing  Co., 
Wooster,   Ohio. 


. « '-I  ^  - 


,  »r" 


-4  PL^A  FOi?  HEDONISM, 


John  C.  Palmer,  Jr.,  Ph.  D.,  Wellsburg,  W.  Va. 


A  Graduating  Thesis;  Course  A,  Philosophy. 


'•'y<         ,    ,_   ._  ^; 


'<•■ 


l»      -i     ''■^  S      ^-i<  ^ 

—     —     ^^^ 


.;>-'"* 


I.     INTRODUCTORY. 

It  is  the  purpose  of  this  essay  to  show  that  the  ulti- 
mate ethical  question  is  the  question  of  the  consequences 
of  our  actions.    Ethics  has  to  deal  with  human  conduct 
and    its    consequences.     The    consequences    of  conduct 
determine    the    permissibility    or  advisability    of    the 
conduct.    I  expect  further  to  show  that  it  is  the  pleasant 
or  painful  conseqnences'of  our  acts  in  which  we  are  inter- 
ested.   If  we  were  not  sentient  creatures,  that  is,  if  we 
merely  had  knowledge  without  any  feeling  of  pleasure  or 
pain  in  that  knowledge,  with  that  knowledge  there  would 
be  no  problem  of  conduct,  for  there  would  be  no  conduct. 
In  other  words,  our  sentience  lies  at  the  base  of  our  activ- 
ity.*    To  put  the  matter  in  terms  of  mechanics,  it  is 
because  we  find  ourseves  in  unstable  equilibrium,  in  a 
state  of  unrest  or  discomfort,  that  we  act.    Our  actions 
are  for  the  sake  of  establishing  a  new  equilibrium  in  our 
sentient  consciousness. 

'See  Taylor,  The  Problem  of  Conduct,  Page  338. 


g  A  Plea  for  Eedoimm. 

In  the  following  discussion,  I  assume  that  a  man  is  a  per- 
sonality, a  center  of  hiteliigent  activity.  He  is  different 
from  the  brook  and  the  growing  tree,  even  though  we  can- 
not state  the  difference  in  terms  of  human  speech.  He  is 
different  again  from  a  mere  creature  of  instinct  and  impulse. 
His  intelligence  makes  him  an  original  center  of  force, 
even  though  we  cannot  explain  the  nature  of  voluntary 
activity,  or  conduct.  These  assumptions  are  not 
intended  to  settle  any  metaphysical  controversy.  But 
unless  we  make  such  assumptions,  man  becomes  a  inere 
machme,  an  irresponsible  and  delusive  mechanism. 
Ethics,  from  her  place  as  the  queen  of  science,  is  degraded 
to  a  subordinate  place  among  the  mechanical  sciences. 
Such  a  conclusion  would  involve  consequences  too  serious 
to  be  lightly  accepted.  If  man  is  a  machine,  political 
science  and  theology  are  as  meaningless  as  astrology  and 

magic' 

Hedonism  does  not  require  the  assumption  of  a  pur- 
pose in  the  universe,  yet  it  welcomes  such  an  assumption, 
so  long  as  one  takes  all  the  facts  of  human  existence  into 
account.  Neither  does  Hedonism  assume  the  immor- 
tality of  the  human  soul,  nor  even  its  existence  after 
death.  But  here  again  it  welcomes  any  light  which  re- 
ligion or  theology  can  throw  upon  the  subject  of  man's 
destiny.  Starting  with  man  as  a  sentient,  intelli- 
gent consciousness.  Hedonism  seeks  to  determine  his  re- 
lation to  the  rest  of  Universe,  and  what  share  he  has  in 
the  evolution  of  his  destiny.  We  begin  neither  on  the  side 
of  the  Optimist  nor  the  Pessimist,  neither  with  the  Stoic 
nor  the  Epicurean.  With  whom  we  shall  end  depends  on 
evidence  which  shall  be  forthcoming. 

As  one  reads  treatise  after  treatise  on  the  subject  of 
ethics,  he  feels  that  |the  writers  are,  after  all,  consciously 
or  unconsciously,  striving  to  answer  the  same  question  and 
that  question  is:  How  may  Human  Welfare  be  Advanced? 
It  does  not  matter  that  the  real  questionjs  lost  sight  of  in 
the  midst  of  metaphysical  and  psychological  meanderings. 
It  is  ever  present,  like  the  theme  in  a  technical  musical  com- 

«Cf.  W.  Wallace,  Lectures  aud  Essays,  pages  250  and  251, 


A  Plea  for  Hedonism. 


position.  Metaphysical,  psychological,  and  physiological 
discussions  interest  us,  because  we  hope  that  they  will 
throw  some  light  on  the  ultimate  question  of  human 
welfare  and  human  destiny. 

Ethics,  is  then,  essentially  a  science  of  man,  his  wel- 
fare and  his  destiny.  If  ethics  puts  to  itself  the  question, 
why  should  this  thing  be  done,  and  that  omitted,  it  is 
because  the  former  tends  to  promote  human  welfare, 
while  the  latter  would  retard  or  prevent  it. 

But  the  term  welfare  is  a  broad,  abstract  term, 
about  whose  content  and  meaning  there  maybe  difference 
of  opinion.  Welfare  is  equivalent  to  doing  or  faring  well. 
But  what  is  **well"?  The  ethical  problem,  then,  is 
merely  stated  when  reduced  to  terms  of  human  welfare. 
Before  we  can  decide  finally  whatis  'Veil"  fora  man  orfor 
the  human  race,  we  should  know  something  of  the  origin 
and  nature  of  the  individual  and  the  race.  We  ought  to 
know  the  place  of  man  the  individual,  and  man  the  species 
in  the  universe.  From  the  standpoint  of  Hedonism,  the 
problem  of  human  conduct  cannot  receive  a  final  solution 
till  we  are  aware  of  every  fact  which  can  affect  the  conse- 
quences of  human  activity.  But  at  the  same*  time,  the 
Hedonist  insists  on  our  making  the  best  of  such  facts  as 
are  available.  Because  we  are  not  aware  of  all  the  conse- 
quences of  our  acts,  we  are  by  no  means  justified  in 
neglecting  such  consequences  as  are  now  familiar.  Uncer- 
tainty as  to  the  ultimate  purpose  or  destiny  of  the  race 
should  not  diminish  my  interest  in  my  own  personal 
destiny  and  welfare. 

Prior  to  the  nineteenth  century,  ignorance  of  man's 
nature  and  origin  and  his  relation  to  the  rest  of  the  uni- 
verse greatly  hindered  any  intelligent  answer  to  the  ques- 
tion as  to  his  place  and  function  in  the  universe  at  large. 
So  long  as  each  individual  was  looked  upon  as  a  special 
piece  of  workmanship,  shaped  according  to  a  set  pattern, 
like  a  statue  or  a  piano,  it  was  impossible  to  arrive  at  a 
correct  idea  of  man's  place  in  Nature.  But  when  the  doc- 
trine of  evolution  made  it  possible  to  study  man  as  a 
growth,  a  mind  among  minds,  an  animal  among  animals 
and  a  living  organism  among  living  orjganisms,  suhiject 


Ji  Flea  for  H$doniBm. 


to  definite  laws  and  principles,  his  present  character  and 
future  possibilities  became  a  matter  of  supremest  interest. 
When  we  apply  the  doctrine  of  natural  selection  to  man, 
every  trait  of  character  and  shade  of  temperament  is 
pregnant  with  meaning;  every  institution,  past  or  pre- 
sent, is  worthy  of  study  as  having  been  a  help  or  hindrance 
to  human  progress.  But  in  our  study  of  man  and  his  en- 
viroment,  we  must  not  forget  an  important  distinction, 
which  is  frequently  overlooked.  Nature,  so  far  as 
we  can  learn,  is  the  product  of  a  single  system  of 
forces,  working  apparently  according  to  a  harmonious 
plan.  (Whether  nature  is  the  product  of  mere  chance,  of 
preordained  pupose,  or  of  other  Power,  this  is  not  the 
place  to  inquire.)  Man,  on  the  other  hand,  according  to 
our  previous  assumption,  is  a  center  of  force  within  a 
force,  a  plan  within  a  plan.  His  evolution  is  the  combin- 
ed product  of  nature  and  his  own  intelligence,  and  the 
share  of  each  of  these  forces,  in  the  product,  is  at  this 
moment  a  warmly  disputed  question,  as  the  recent  works 
of  such  men  as  Benjamin  Kidd,  A.  E.  Taylor,  and  others 
bear  evidence.  I  shall  have  more  to  say  on  the  subject  in  a 
laterpartof  this  essay;  at  present- it  will  suffice  to  say 
that  in  my  opinion  the  part  played  by  intelligence  in  the 
development  of  man  and  human  institutions  has  been 
much  larger  than  evolutionary  philosophers  are  inclined 
to  admit.  Most  of  our  ethical  concepts  and  beliefs,  it 
seems  to  me,  are  the  result  of  the  perception  or  the  sup- 
posed perceptions  of  the  consequences  of  actions.  Even 
our  ethical  emotions  are  to  a  considerable  extent,  altho 
by  no  means  altogether,  the  product  of  individual  and 
racial  experience.  By  means  of  intelligence  and  its  in- 
strument, language,  the  individual  and  the  society  of  to- 
day are  the  heirs  of  a  rich  estate  in  experience.  Our  con^ 
cepts  and  beliefs  have  come  down  to  us  like  precious  heir- 
looms, well  tested  and  ready  for  use;  not,  however,  thi-o' 
inherited  brain  and  nerve  tissue,  but  by  example,  train- 
ing, custom,  institutions,  and  word  of  mouth.  This  view, 
I  am  well  aware,  is  in  opposition  both  to  those  of  the  in- 
tuitionists,  led  by  such  men  as  James  Martmeau  and 
Hwrry  Calderwood,  on  tlie  one  hand,  and  to  tho«e  of  fhe 


A  Plea,  for  Hedonism, 


eVbltrtionistB,   ted    by   Herbert  Speneer,  A.   Snthertand, 
and  Leslie  Stephen,  on  the  other. 

The  intuitionists  go  too  far  in  making  our  ethical 
emotions,  concepts,  and  beliefs,  purely  innate  or  intuitive, 
and  hence  inexplicable,  and  not  to  be  tampered  with.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  evolutionists  go  too  far  in  trying  to 
explain  the  origin  of  all  our  emotions,  concepts  and 
beliefs  by  means  of  evolution  alone.  While  we  all  admit 
that  the  civilized  man  of  today  is  somewhat  superior  to 
the  savage  of  six  thousand  years  ago  in  ethical  emotions, 
yet  when  we  reflect,  on  the  one  hand,  on  the  immense  prog- 
ress in  emotional  and  ethical  development  which  the  negro 
has  undergone  during  the  three  hundred  years  of  his  sojourn 
in  America,  and  on  the  other  hand  on  the  fact  that  the 
child  of  refined  parents,  thrown  by  chance  among  savages 
(a  very  common  occurrence  in  colonial  days  in  America) 
exhibits  no  higher  ethical  emotions,  concepts  and  beliefs 
than  his  savage  fellows,  we  are  forced  to  the  conclusion 
that  most  of  the  ethical  emotions,  concepts  and  beliefs  are 
institutional  in  origin,  that  is,  the  results  of  the  accumu- 
lated experience  of  the  rax^e,  gathered  and  transmitted  in 
maxims,  proverbs,  institutions  and  even  in  the  very 
words  of  the  language  itself.  Suppose,  for  instance,  that 
a  million  infants  were  selected  from  the  most 
refined  homes  in  the  world  and  transported  to  a  deserted 
island  unfrequented  by  men,  and  sustained  by  ravens 
until  they  were  old  enough  to  care  for  themselves;  is  it 
not  almost  certain  that  the  children  would  in  time  become 
the  most  degraded  savages?  Indeed,  unless  the  island 
were  entirely  free  from  noxious  animals  and  poisonous 
plants,  it  is  very  probable  that  the  whole  colony  would 
perish  in  a  very  few  years.  Be  this  as  it  may,  I  cannot 
conceive  that  the  rapid  development  of  ethical  concepts 
in  western  Europe  within  the  last  few  centuries  could  be 
the  result  of  so  slow  a  progress  as  evolution.  Leslie 
Stephen,  in  his  English  Utilitarians,  remarks  *'the  sudden 
awakening  of  the  public  conscience'"  in  England  on  the 
slave  trade  just  prior  to  the  French  Revolution.    Before 

•The  Eng.  Util.  Vol.  I,  page  1 13-14. 


6 


A  Plea  for  Hedonism. 


that  awakening,  the  most  respectable  people  engaged  in 
the  trade  without  a  qualm  of  conscience.    The  generation 
which  is  just  passing  in  America  can  recall  a  like  awaken- 
ing here  on  the  slave  question.    Even  the  time  which  has 
elapsed  since  the  days  of  Socrates,  Plato,  and  Ariostotle 
is  not  sufficient  to  account  for  the  marked  advance  on 
Grecian  ethical  concepts  which  is  so  strikingly  depicted 
in  T.  H.  Green's  Prolegomena  to  Ethics.    Much  less  could 
the  slow  progress  of  mental  evolution  account  for  the 
wonderful  changes  in  et  hical  concepts  which  A.  Suther- 
land has  so  masterfully  i)ictured  in  his  Origin  and  Growth 
of  the  Moral  Instinct.     But  when  we  note  the  strides 
which  the  sciences  have  made  since  the  days  of  Socrates, 
and  particulariy  within  the  last  three  centuries,  when  we 
reeall  the  progress  of  the  arts  and  of  our  knowledge  of  all 
that  relates  to  man's  physical  and  social  well-being,  we  need 
not  bt  surprised  at  the  rai  )id  changes  which  have  taken  place 
in  men's  ethical  notions.    And  when  we  reflect  upon  the 
forceof  habit,  the  strengtli  of  custom,  the  tenacity  ofinher- 
ited  beliefs,  and  the  universal  ignorance  of  the  ultimate 
foundation  of  institutions  in  general,  we  can  only  be  sur- 
prised that  opinions  have  yielded  as  rapidly  as  they  have 
to  the  wave  of  progress*.    But  if  the  evolutionists  have  in 
their  z«al  gone  too  far  in  ascribing  the  whole  of  man's  prog- 
ress to  the  power  of  evolution,  they  have,  until  the  last  few 
years,  failed  to  emphasize  sufficiently  the  importance  of 
the  part  which  nature  plays  in  developing  the  anti-selfish 
or  altruistic  emotions.    So  far  as  I  know,  Benjamin  Kidd, 
in  his  social  evolution,  was  the  first  to  call  attention  to 
this    remarkable  fact.     I     shall    discuss    the     subject. 
At  present  I  need  only  say  that  I  regard  this  peculiar  fact, 
that  nature  develops  the  race  in  opposition  to  the  indi- 
vidual's development  of  himself,  as  one  of  the  greatest 
marvels  in  science  and  at  the  same  time  the  solution  of 
the  apparent  contradiction  which  runs  all  through  human 
life  and  activity.    I  belie /e  it  off ers  the  only  solution  of 
the  ethical  problem,  the  only  basis  for  harmonizing  con- 
flicting ethical  theories.    In  this  brief  essay  I  can  do  no 

*See  I^esUe  Stephen,  the  Eng.  Util.  Vol.  I,  page  5. 


A  Plea  for  Hedonism,  f 

more  than  blaie  a  few  trees  along  the  route,  leaving 
to  others  the  work  of  clearing  a  broad  highway. 

n.    THE  CRITERION  OP  CONDUCT. 

1.    Evolution  and  Ethics. 

As  I  stated  in  the  preliminary  section,  ethics  was  still 
in  need  of  an  element  in  the  form  of  evolution  before  it 
could  give  a  satisfactory  and  rational  account  of  human 
activity  and  conduct.  So  long  as  human  instincts  and 
human  prejudices  had  to  be  accepted  as  inexplicable  facts, 
it  was  impossible  to  distinguish  instinctive  and  impulsive 
activity  from  voluntary  conduct.  No  one  could  gainsay 
the  arguments  of  the  intuitionist,  no  matter  how  absurd 
his  pretensions  might  be.  The  claim  of  the  Morman  and 
Mohammedan  of  the  right  to  enjoy  more  than  one  wife, 
the  claim  of  the  cannibal  to  eat  his  enemy,  and  the  claim 
of  the  hermit  to  the  right  to  live  an  isolated  life  were 
equally  unassailable.  But  since  evolution  has  pointed 
out  the  probable  origin  and  the  growth  of  not  only 
nearly  every  human  institution,  but  of  the  very  moral 
sentiments  themselves,  intuitionism  is,  in  the  words  of 
Professor  Muirhead,  "entirely  out  of  court."*  The  ideas 
of  law  and  gradual  development  throw  a  new  light  on 
every  phase  of  human  nature  and  human  institutions. 
According  to  the  doctrine  of  evolution,  the  individual 
man,  as  well  as  man  the  species,  is  the  product  of  a 
gradual  development;  and  this  development  is  largely 
by  means  of  natural  selection  through  the  survival  of  the 
fittest  in  the  struggle  for  existence.  When  the  facts  of  the 
struggle  for  existence  are  first  presented  to  us,  they  are 
apt  to  produce  quite  a  shock  to  our  moral  feelings.  The 
amount  of  suffering  involved  in  the  process  is  simply 
inconceivable  and  inexplicable.  It  was  these  facts  that  J. 
S.  Mill  hfitd  in  mind  when  he  wrote  his  scathing  essay  on 
Nature.  The  startling  and  yet  unquestionable  details 
given  in  the  first  few  chapters  of  Sutherland's  Origin  and 
Growth  of  the  Moral  Instinct  show  conclusively  that 
nature  does  not  have  much  regard  for  the  individual. 


^Elements  of  Ethics,  p.  134. 


B  A  Plea  for  Hedoniam, 

She  is  apparenty  W(yrkin^  for  the  benefit  of  tSie  r»c©,  and 
seems  utterly  indifferent  bo  the  sufferings  and  destruction 
of  individuals.     If  we   were  permitted  to  judge  nature 
from  the  human  stand])oint,  it  might  be  pretty  hard  to 
determine  whether  she  is  benevolent  or  malevolent.^    But 
the  ultimate  purpose   of  conscious   existence  is  still  a 
mystery  to  us,  unless  v/e  accept  revealed  religion.    The 
problem  of  evil  is  no  nearer  solution  than  in  the  days  of 
Job.    It  is  the  Pons  Asiiiorum  of  theological  ethics.    We 
have   no   right,   therefore,  to   judge   nature  by  human 
standards.    It  is  evident,  however,  that  nature  is  gradu- 
ally developing  higher  (in  the  sense  of  more  complex) 
forms  of  animal  life;   and  in  man,  the  highest  animal,  of 
sentient  intelligence.    Bat  the  individual  is  short-lived, 
while  the  race  continues.    Consequently,  one  of  the  most 
difficult  problems  of  ethics  is  the  question:  What  interest 
has  the  individual  in  the  persistence  of  the  race?    It  is 
evident  that  Hedonism  has  no  object  in  evading  facts  or 
denying  the  truth.    It  frankly  admits,  therefore,  that  at 
present  the  interest  of  the  individual  and  that  of  society 
at  large  do  not,  so  far  as  we  can  judge,  exactly  tally  or 
correspond.^    That  the  time  will  come  to  which  Herbert 
Spencer  looks  forward,  in  which  society  will  be  in  such 
perfect   equilibrium   that   each   individual   will  find   his 
own  greatest  good  in  working  for  the  greatest  good  of  all 
other  men  is  a  possibility,  an  ideal  at  which  the  wise 
hedonist  will  aim  as  a  final  goal.    But  in  the  meantime, 
the  individual,  as  the  body  politic,  must  have  rules  of 
action.    We  must  not  prepare  our  vehicles  for  the  smooth 
tableland  of  human  perfection  till  we  have  scaled  the 
mountains  of   human  frailty,  ignorance  and  error.    So 
far  as  social  welfare  coincides  with  individual  welfare  the 
question  presents  no  difficulties.    And  as  we  show  else- 
where, the  margin  of  confiict  is  at  present  very  narrow 
and  tends  gradually  to  disappear.    Iladley  says,^  "Rat- 


•See  Paulwn,  Introd.  to  Phil.,  p.  153. 

'See  B.  Kidd,  Western  Civilization,  Chap.  II,  i;  Stephen,  Science  of 
Chap.  VII;  Spencer,  Data  of  Ethics,  Chap.  12. 
'Boonomics,  p.  14. 


A  Plea  for  Hedonism. 


ional  egotism  and  rational  altruism  tend  to  cofticide." 
But  a  margin  of  conflict  there  undoubtedly  is  at  present. 
And  if  the  race  is  to  be  maintained,  nature  must  some- 
how win  the  day  and  compel  the  individual  to  act  against 
his  own  interest  and  in  favor  of  the  social  interest.  This, 
as  I  show  later,  she  does  by  means  of  the  instincts  and 
emotions.  Mr.  Huxley,  in  his  lecture  on  Evolution  and 
Ethics,  insists  that  the  ^'ethical  process"  and  the  ''evolu- 
tionary process"  are  in  direct  conflict.  Benevolence,  al- 
truistic conduct  and  sympathy  are,  according  to  him,  in 
direct  contravention  to  the  struggle  for  existence,  which 
is  the  evolutionary  process.  But  I  am  forced  to  disagree 
with  him.  (Huxley  makes  a  recantation  in  the  appendix 
to  this  lecture. )  The  social  instincts  are  direct  products 
of  evolution.  And  so  far  as  disinterested  a.ctivity,  so 
called,  rests  on  a  religious  sanction,  it  is  not  really  dis- 
interested, as  I  showed  above. 

The  practical  difficulty  raised  by  Nietzsche  and  his 
followers  is  much  more  serious.  Are  we  to  let  the  sympa- 
thetic impulses  act  to  the  extent  of  reversing  the  work  of 
evolution  and  preventing  the  survival  of  the  fittest? 
Our  institutions  for  preserving  the  weak,  the  defective, 
and  the  degenerate  certainly  make  the  question  of  serious 
importance,  especially  as  the  religious  and  ethical 
opinions  of  the  present  day  tend  to  encourage  the  senti- 
ment in  favor  of  the  preservation  of  the  classes  which 
would  otherwise  perish.^  Taylor  points  out  the  difl^culty 
referred  to  above  and  calls  it  the  *Taradox  of  Benevo- 
lence." (See  below  the  problem  of  altruism.)  The  only 
answer  which  Hedonism  can  give,  aside  from  one  based 
on  religious  doctrines,  is  that  nature  muet  solve  the 
question  for  herself.  Our  sentiments  for  the  weak  may  be 
illogical,  but  they  are  facts;  and  Hedonism  sticks  to  the 
facts  of  human  nature.  Nor  does  it  seem  possible  to 
reason  ourselves  away  from  these  sentiments,  even  if  we 
disregard  religion.  Huxley  insists  as  strongly  on  the 
vaUdity  of  the  ethical  process  as  do  Benjamin  Kidd  and 
Dr.  Martineau. 

•See  E.  A.  Taylor,  Prob.  of  Conduct,  p.  272  et  seq. 


10 


A  Plea  for  Hedonism, 


But  while  the  Hfidonist  admlte  that  godal  welfare 
and  individual  welfare  do  not  precisely  tally,  he  denies 
that  there  ii  any  serious  decrepancy  between  them  even 
at  present.    The  apparent  discrepancies  are  largely  due  to 
our  ignorance  either  of  the  real  welfare  of  the  society  or 
that  of  the  individual.    Only  too  often  in  the  past,  the 
welfare  of  the  individual  has  been  sacrificed  to  the  sup- 
posed welfare  of  the  state.    So  wise  a  philospher  as  Aris- 
totle, for  example,  seemed  to  think  that  slavery  is  a  part 
of  the  plan  of  nature.    He  did  not  think  that  slaves  could 
be  dispensed  with  until  shuttles  ceased  to  be  thrown. 
Nearly  every  nation,  past  and  present,  has  put  more 
or  less  restraint  upon  the   women.    Yet  those  nations 
which  have  put  confidence  in  her  find  that  most,  if  not  all, 
the  restraints  of  the  past  were  uncalled  for.    Perhaps  in 
no  distant  age  the  enforced  military  service  of  today  will 
seem  as  barbarous  to  those  nations  that  still  practice  it 
as  the  crudities  of  the  feudal  system  now  seems  to  expert 
political  scientists.    On  the  other  hand,  the  welfare  of  the 
state  has  been    at  times   as   clearly   sacrificed    to   the 
supposed  rights  of  the  individual.    For  example,  when  the 
individual  was  allowed  to  be  lord  of  his  own  domain  to 
the  extent  of  making  it  a  place  for  germs  of  disease  to 
grow  and  spread;  or  when  each  parent  was  left  to  educate 
or  not  educate  his  children  as  he  saw  fit;  or  when  favored 
individuals  were  allowed  to  monopolize  the  land,  water, 
or  other  means  of  producing  a  living."    Only   in  recent 
years  have  the  laws  of  social  growth  and  decay  been 
studied  in  a  truly  scientiiic  way.    And  what  a  fund  of 
information  has  already  been  brought  to  light.     The 
works  of  Sohm,  Mommsen  and  others  on  Roman  history 
and  faistitutions;  the  works  of  Maine,  Spencer,  Tyler  and 
others  in  England,  and  Wundt,    Waitz   and   others  in 
Germany  on  the  early  history  and  institutions  of  man- 
kind generally;  and  the  special  works  on  sociology  and 
social  evolution  of  Spencer,  Kidd,  Lombroso  and  others 

lOTliese  lines  weie  written  btfore  the  great  coal  strike  of  1902  In 
Pennsylvania  brought  this  particular  insUnce  strongly  before  the  mind 
of  everyone. 


A  Plea  tor  HedoniBm. 


11 


demonstrate  beyond  any  possible  deubt  how  smedl  a 
share  the  men  in  the  past  had  in  their  own  development, 
or  rather,  how  unconscious  a  share.  For  nature  requires 
every  creature  to  work  out  his  own  salvation.  She 
neither  increases  nor  dimishes  the  effects  of  a  creature's 
own  acts.  She  establishes  the  laws  of  progress,  and  those 
who  conform  to  them  will  survive;  the  rest  will  perish. 
It  is  not  my  purpose,  however,  to  show  why  the  laws  of 
nature  are  as  they  are,  but  rather  to  point  out  what  some 
of  them  are.  Those  who  wish  to  see  nature  rebuked  may 
read  J.  S.  MilPs  essay  on  Nature,  those  on  the  other  hand 
who  wish  to  hear  her  praises  sounded  may  read  their 
Bridgewater  Treatise,  their  Emerson  or  their  Spencer. 
The  Hedonist  prefers  to  accept  the  laws  of  nature  as  facts 
and  to  spend  his  strength  in  adapting  himself  to  those 
laws. 

This  much  then  is  certain;  before  man  could  become  a 
social  creature.  Nature  must  have  developed  in  him  a 
social  impulse  or  social  pleasure  strong  enough  to  over- 
come his  objections  to  yielding  up  the  liberties  he  could 
enjoy  as  an  independent  individual.    But  these  liberties 
could  not  conceivably  have  been  either  very  great  or  very 
valuable.    The  primitive  man  had   almost  nothing  to 
gain,  and  very  much  to  lose   by  living  alone.    But  as 
society  gradually  advances,  numerically,  economically, 
and  otherwise,  the  margin  of  temptation  to  evade  the 
requirements   of  social  order  would  naturally  increase. 
There  must  be  a  corresponding  increase,  therefore,  in  the 
social  cohesiveness.      Mere   increase   of   experience    and 
reasoning  power  would,  perhaps,  only  increase  the  temp- 
tations of  the  individual  to  evade  the  social  law.    Nature 
filled  the  breach  by  preserving  the  individuals  who  were 
slightly  more  gifted  with  the  social  impulse  or  pleasure. 
Thus  generation  after  generation,  little  by  little  nature 
built  up  man's  sympathetic  nature.    Much  of  it  she  built 
up  for  him  no  doubt,  before  he  became  man  at  all.    For 
we  find  the  social  and  domestic  instincts  well  developed  In 
many  of  the  lower  animals."    Primitive  man  had  still  a 

"Sutherland,  Origin  and  Growth  of  the  Moral  Instinct,  Vol.  I. 


13 


A  Plea  ior  Hedonism, 


A  Plea  for  Hedonism. 


IB 


Tafft  amonnt  of  social  impulse  and  i^mpathy  t»  der^op 
before  he  could  live  in  large  societies,  under  elaborate 
institutions.  But  this  is  not  the  place  to  pursue  this  sub- 
ject further.  Those  who  wish  to  read  a  full  discussion  of 
the  subject  of  the  origin  and  growth  of  the  moral  instincts 
are  referred  to  the  elaborate  as  well  as  interesting  work  of 
Sutherland.  My  wish  is  only  to  show  the  attitude  of  He- 
donism toward  nature  and  her  laws.  The  man  with  whom 
ethics  has  to  deal  is  not,  therefore,  a  purely  self-centered 
being.  His  very  constitution  makes  him  to  a  greater  or 
less  extent  interested  in  the  welfare  of  his  fellow  beings. 
If  this  were  not  so,  mankind  would  never  have  been  drawn 
into  group  life. 

2.    The  Canon  of  Consequences. 

Every  ethical  theory  must  sooner  or  later  find  itself 
driven    to  answer  the  question.    What  constitutes   the 
moralty  of  an  act?    Wherein  does  one  act   differ  from 
another?    Why  may  I  do  this  and  not  do  that?    The 
terms,  "Ought,"  "Right,"  "Good,"  "Approval"  and  their 
opposites  imply  the  existence  of  an  answer  to  these  ques- 
tions.   Many  answers  may  have  been  given  to  the  above 
questions.    One  group  of  moralists  state  in  effect  that  the 
morality  of  an  act  is  something  ultimate,  eternal,  immut- 
able and  inexplicable;  that  right  and  wrong  are  like  right 
and  left,  up  and  down,  round  and  square.    Those  who 
give  this  answer  become  hopelessly  confused  when  we  ask 
them  how  they  know  what  acts  fall  in  one  class  and  what 
in  the  other.    The  well    known   conflict   in   the    actual 
judgments  of  men  as  to  the  classification  of  acts  morally, 
proves  conclusively  that  we  have  no  sense  or  intuition 
which  will  infallibly  guide  us  in  this  matter.    And  even  if 
such  a  sense  actually  existed  in  each  of  us,  we  might  still 
question  its  authority  as  a  guide  to  action.    I  might  still 
eav:  granted  that  intuition  tells  me  this  act  is  what  you 
call  right,  yet  why  must  I  perform  it!    Thus  the  intuition- 
ist  must  at  last  fall  back  on  some  more  ultimate  reason 
for  his  ethical  classification.    This   is   usually   done  by 
saying  the  right  act  is  so  commanded  by  God.    But  this 
assertion  still  permits  me  to  ask,    Why  must  I  obey  the 


will  or  command  of  my  fellow  men,  or  my  own  will?  The 
only  conclusive  answer  to  this  query  is  that  God  has 
power  to  reward  me  if  I  obey,  and  punish  me  if  I  disobey, 
and  will  do  so.  That  answer  gives  the  terms  right  and 
wrong  and  intelligible,  because  sentient,  content. 

Another  group  of  moralists,  at  whose  head  is  Imman- 
uel  Kant,  answer  the  ultimate  ethical  question  by  saying 
that  the  morality  of  an  act  is  its  fitness  to  become  a 
universal  law  or  maxim  of  conduct.  A  moral  act  is  one 
which  we  can  wish  anybody  and  everybody  to  perform. 
But  it  is  evident  that  this  answer  is  purely  formal.  We 
must  still  experience  the  various  consequences  of  the 
various  kinds  of  acts  before  we  can  say  whether  we  are 
willing  for  all  men  to  perform  them."  In  other  words,  we 
must  fall  back  on  the  consequences  of  actions.  Those 
acts  which  benefit  us  we  will  want  other  men  to  perform.  - 
Those  acts  which  pain  or  injure  us  we  shall  want  them  to 
omit." 

Another  group  of  moralists  argue  that  the  morality 
of  an  act  lies  in  its  tendency  to  promote  the  perfection  of 
an  action.  But  the  term  "perfection"  is  empty  until  we 
have  formed  an  idea  of  perfection.  Perfection  relates 
rather  to  the  means  than  to  the  end.^^  The  means  are 
perfect  when  they  are  best  adapted  to  accomplish  the 
given  design  or  purpose.  Perhaps  we  are  not  yet  pre- 
pared to  define  the  perfect  man;  but  a  tentative  definition 
must  certainly  include  his  sentient  nature,  that  is,  his 
capacity  to  suffer  and  enjoy;  the  perfect  man  will  be  least 
subject  to  pain  and  best  equipped  for  enjoyment.  Those, 
such  as  Dr.  Paul  Carus,^^  who  make  work  the  ideal  of 
conduct  overlook  the  fact  that  work  is  a  means,  not  an 
end.  I,  as  a  free  creature,  live,  keep  healthly,  and  work, 
for  the  sake  of  carrying  out  my  ideal.  The  work,  the  life, 
and  the  health  themselves  I  care  nothing  about.  It  is  the 
fullest  sentient  consciousness  that  I  desire;  and  because 


'^See  Caird,  Crit.  Philos.  of  Kant,  II.  p.  290. 
"Taylor,  op.  cit.,p.  351. 

"AlcKander,  Moral  Order  and  Progress,  p.  190. 
^h«  EtWcafl  Problem,  2nd  ed. 


14 


A  FU&  for  Hedonism. 


A  Plea  ior  Hedonism, 


Id 


m 


l!. 


life  health  and  work  make  this  possible,  I  care  for  them  a^ 
mekns.i^    Experience  reveals  to  us  the  laws  of  cause  and 
effect,  the  unity  of  Nature  and  the  conservation  of  force. 
The  whole  universe,  so  far  as  we  know  it,  is  subject  to 
universal   laws.     Man,   along   with  his   fellow   animals, 
has  been  developed  from  lower  creatures  by  means  of  the 
natural  selection  of  advantageous  variations  in  form  and 
character  (together  with  other  forces  yet  unknown   no 
doubt) .    After  the  appearance  of  intelligence  and  volition, 
animals  have  some  share  in  the  shaping  of  their  ownhves. 
Man  has  far  outstriped  his  fellow  animals  in  intelligence, 
as  to  memory,  power  of  attention,  observation,  associa- 
tion of  ideas  and  reason.    With  the  dawn  of  reason,  man 
began  to  observe  the  consequences  of  his  actions.    Those 
actions  which  conduced  to  his  pleasure  or  preservation, 
and  especially  to  the  latter,  were  repeated.    Those  men 
who  were  luckiest  in  hitting  upon  the  most  preservative 
acts  succeeded  in  the  race  for  existence,  for  rather  persis- 
tence)   while  their  less   fortunate    neighbors    perished. 
As  intelligence  continued  to  develop,  men  began  to  study 
the  consequences  of  their  actions  with  more  care.    In  time 
certain  consequences  became  so  well  known  that  every 
man  knew   how   to   bring   them   about   and  they  were 
accepted  as  a  matter  of  course.    But  there  was  always  a 
margin,  and  a  large  margin  of  acts  the  utility  of  whose 
consequences  was  disputed.    Men  could  not  agree  as  to 
whether  these   acts  should  be  done  or  not.    This   waa 
especially  true  of  acts  whose  coDsequences  were  complex 
or  remote.    But  whenever  the  consequences,  (that  is,  the 
aggressive  or  approximately  total  consequences)  of  an 
act  were  well  known  or  supposed  to  be  known,  men  gener- 
ally  agreed  as  to  its  morality,  that  is,  as  to  whether  it 
should  be  done  or  omitted.    The  desired   consequences 
have  uiually  been  the  escape  from  bodily  or  mental  pain, 
from  disease,  suffering  and  torment,  in  this  life  and  the 
next  as  might  be  within  reach.    A  study  of  the  actual 
systems  of  morality  and  the  actual  desires,  fears   hopes 
and  ambitions  of  men,  past  and  present,  will,  I  believe, 

*^iylor,  Problem  of  Conduct,  p.  533' 


show  the  correctness  of  this  analysis.  The  consequences 
of  an  act,  in  terms  of  pleasure  and  pain,  are  and  must  be 
the  ultimate  criterion  of  its  morality  or  permissibility. 
Any  other  criterion  must,  sooner  or  later,  resolve  itself 
into  this  one.  Every  formal  criterion  of  activity  must 
have  a  content  of  sentience  before  it  is  of  any  practical 
value.  A  sentient  consciousness  is  never  satisfied  with  a 
formal  answer  to  the  query.  Why  must  I  do  this?  But 
an  answer  in  terms  of  pleasure  and  pain  gives  immediate 
and  complete  satisfaction.  When  I  direct  an  intelligent 
creature  not  to  do  a  thing  because  the  consequences  of 
doing  it  are  thus  and  so,  he  can  determine  for  himself 
whether  I  have  pointed  out  a  sufficient  sanction  for  the  law 
I  have  asserted.  I  trespass  neither  on  his  freedom  of 
judgment  nor  on  his  freedom  of  action.  The  law  is  not 
categorical  or  imperative.  It  is  disjunctive.  Each  person 
may  determine  for  himself  whether  to  accept  or  reject  the 
consequences  of  an  act. 

This  Hedonism,  which  is  based  on  the  canon  of  conse- 
quences, is  the  only  logical  doctrine  of  ethics. 

3.    The  Province  of  Intelligence. 

One  more  point  and  I  shall  have  finished  the  outline 
of  what  I  regard  as  the  essentials  of  Hedonism.  I  have 
pointed  out  that  most  of  the  human  suffering  and  error 
of  the  past  was  the  result  of  ignorance  and  imperfection. 
We  have  further  seen  that  even  the  well-meant  efforts  of 
men  acting  together  in  society  to  better  their  condition 
have  very  often  produced  the  reverse  of  the  intended 
effects.  The  question  will  now  occur:  Would  it  not  be 
better  to  abandon  ourselves  entirely  to  the  care  of  nature, 
and  not  attempt  to  guide  men  by  human  laws  and 
human  institutions?  More  than  one  leading  thinker  has 
advocated  such  a  course.  Long  before  any  one  thought 
of  applying  the  laws  of  evolution  to  the  growth  of 
society,  Rousseau  proposed  that  men  should  go  back  to  a 
state  of  nature.  Many  of  the  leading  economists  of  the 
last  century  advocated  to  some  extent  a  similar  view  in 
their  "laissez  faire*'  doctrine.  Even  Herbert  Spencer  €«id 
hxB  Tollowers  take  the  same  position,  apparently,  at  times 


16 


A  Plea  for  Hedonism, 


when  denouncing  the  legislation  of  the  past  and  present. 
But  after  ail,  men's  disposition  to  form  these  institutions 
is  also  a  natural  disposition,  and  a  wise  gecond  thought 
shows  us  that,  in  spite  of  all  his  mistakes,  the  man  of 
today  has  survived  by  means  of  his  institutions.  Those 
tribes  and  races  whose  laws  and  institutions  were  anti- 
social decayed  and  disappeared;  while  those  who  were 
fortunate  enough  or  wise  enough  to  adopt  beneficial  insti- 
tutions and  laws  survived  and  progressed. 

The  mere  fact  of  survival  shows  that  the  peoples  that 
survived  had  either  internal  or  external  qualities,  or  both 
combined,  that  enabled  them  to  outstrip  their  com- 
petitors in  the  race  for  existence.  The  latter  alternative 
seems  the  more  probable:  there  was  a  combination  of 
mental  traits  and  external  institutions  which  carried  the 
victorious  races  to  the  goal.  But  this  does  not  amount 
to  the  assertion  that  existing  institutions  cannot  be 
improved  upon.  Other  institutions  might  have  been 
devised  which  would  have  proved  infinitely  superior  to 
those  actually  adopted.  Had  the  Athenians,  for  example, 
with  all  their  intellectual  keenness,  their  artistic  insight 
and  their  executive  ability,  devised  a  form  of  federal  gov- 
ernment similar  to  that  of  the  United  States  at  the 
present  day,  or  had  they  even  developed  the  genius  for 
law  and  government  which  the  ancient  Romans  mani- 
fested, no  one  can  say  to  what  degree  of  civilization  they 
might  have  attained.  Or  had  the  Chinese  in  the  days  of 
Confucius  combined  with  their  industry,  sobriety  and 
inventive  cleverness  the  flexibility  of  character  which 
encourages  change  and  progress,  they,  too,  might  have 
become  a  world  power.  Going  still  further  back  into  the 
past,  had  the  ancient  Egyptians  combined  with  their 
marvelous  mechanical  skill,  their  architectural  talent  and 
their  knowledge  of  the  sciences  of  geography,  astronomy 
and  writing  the  inclination  to  educate  the  whole  people 
instead  of  a  favored  class,  and  the  disposition  to  build 
monuments  economically  useful  instead  of  pyramids  and 
spynxes,  they,  too,  might  still  be  the  leading  nation  of 
the  world.  But  what  has  been,  has  been;  our  business  is 
to  study  the  past  for  the  purpose  of  improving  the  future. 


A  Plea  for  Hedoniem, 


IT 


We  have  much  to  learn  from  the  attempt  of  past  genera- 
tions to  solve  the  problems  of  conduct,  both  individual 
and  social.  And  we  may  profit  as  much,  if  not  more,  by 
their  mistakes  than  by  their  successes.  The  science  of 
government  is  yet  far  from  perfect;  it  will  continue  to 
present  new  difficulties  to  each  succeediiig  generation. 
But  men  who  can  live  peaceably  together  in  societies 
aggregating  from  50,000,000  to  100,000,000  are  surely 
much  in  advance  of  savages  who  straggle  about  in  groups 
of  from  ten  to  fifty.  The  institutions  of  the  larger 
groups  are,  to  a  very  great  extent,  based  on  dear-bought 
experience.  They  are  the  result  of  the  accumulated  exper- 
ience and  wisdom  of  the  past.  By  means  of  language, 
oral  and  written,  each  generation  was  able  to  start 
nearly  where  the  preceding  left  off.  The  wisdom  of  the 
group  is  infinitely  beyond  that  of  any  of  the  individuals 
composing  it.  For  the  division  of  labor  and  knowledge 
make  it  impossible  as  well  as  unnecessary  and  unprofit- 
able for  any  one  man  to  carry  all  the  knowledge  of  the 
age  in  his  head.  One  must  not  be  too  positive,  however, 
touching  the  social  value  of  any  institution.  The  laws  of 
social  existence  and  progress  are  so  complex  that  we  can 
only  make  provisional  statements  concerniug  any  insti- 
tution and  wait  for  time  to  demonstrate  whether  we  are 
correct  or  not.  The  germs  of  destruction  may  be  devel- 
oping in  institutions  which  we  look  upon  as  the  most 
precious.  It  follows,  then,  that  both  nature  and  intelli- 
gence must  take  part  in  the  evolution  of  human  destiny. 
Much  of  the  work  only  nature  can  perform.  But  there  is 
also  a  place  for  intelligence,  for  human  reason  and 
endeavor.  If  I  had  time,  it  w^ould  be  easy  to  show  that 
Mr.  Sutherland,  in  his  otherwise  excellent  book  J  ^  has 
committed  the  fault  of  overlooking  the  share  of  intelli- 
gence, as  taught  by  experience,  in  altering  human 
institutions  and  human  ways  of  looking  at  things  and 
conduct.^®  But  I  cannot  agree  with  the  conclusion  of 
Taylor  that  biological  evolution  would  not  have  carried 


**The  Origin  and  Growth  of  Moral  Instinct. 

'®See  the  strong  statement  of  Taylor,  Prob.  of  Conduct,  p.  235  et  seq. 


18 


A  Plea  ioT  Hedoniem. 


iiii 


the  human  race  beyond  the  agricultural  stage.  Nature  is 
not  satisfied  with  the  mere  maintenance  of  the  race.  The 
law  of  eTolution  still  holds  good,  and  those  individuals 
who  happen  to  be  more  sympathetic  and  to  derive  more 
pleasure  from  sympathetic  activity  will  tend  to  survive 
the  less  sympathetic.  Thus  self-interest  and  social  interest 
will  tend,  through  natural  selection,  to  become  identical.^^ 

It  is  the  dawning  perception  of  the  relation  of  things 
that  changes  our  opinions  as  to  the  value  of  conduct,  and 
not,  as  Mr.  Sutherland  insists,  altogether  the  evolution 
of  sympathy  in  us  by  the  secret  force  of  nature.^o 

Whatever  Hedonism  may  have  meant,  therefore,  in 
the  days  of  Aristippus  and  Epicurus,  in  the  days  of 
Hobbes  and  Locke,  or  even  in  the  days  of  Jeremy  Ben- 
tham  and  the  two  Mills,  at  the  present  day  evolutionary 
Hedonism,  when  it  is  careful  not  to  fall  mto  the  vice  of 
mere  mechanism,  means  that  each  of  us  has  the  right  to 
the  fullest  realization  of  himself  which  is  consistent  with 
the  same  right  on  the  part  of  other  intelligent  beings;" 
that  as  man  is  not  only  a  conscious  but  also  a  sentient, 
or  pleasure-pain  creature,  he  is  entitled  to  the  fullest 
development  of  his  whole  nature;  that  pleasure  and 
health  or  welfare  go  hand  in  hand,  while  pain  is  the 
index  of  disorder,  maladjustment,  lack  of  equilibrium,  or 
decay;  that  pain  in  itself  can  never  be  a  good;  at  most 
it  can  only  be  the  negative  means  of  leading  to  something 
else  as  a  good  or  end;"  while  pleasure,  if  not  the  end 
itself,  is  at  least  the  inseparable  accompaniment  of  the 
end,  and  in  the  long  run  the  only  safe  criterion  to  the  end; 
that  nature  (which  may  mean  the  Creator  acting  through 
nature  if  you  like)  takes  care  of  intelligent  creatures  by 
means  of  instincts  and  impulses  until  their  reason  is 
sufficiently  developed  to  perceive  the  purpose  of  pain  and 
pleasure  in  the  economy  of  life  and  their  knowledge  suffi- 
ciently great  to  realize  the  laws  of  nature  and  their  rela- 


>»See  Huxley,  Evolution  and  Ethic*,  Note  20,  p.  114. 
^Stephen,  op.  cit..  p.  103. 
"Spencer,  Prin.  Bthica,  p.  4^. 
"Alexander,  Moral  Order,  etc.»  p.  225. 


ii 


A  Plea  for  Hedomiam. 


19 


i 


tion  to  the  sentient  creature.  Hedonism  takes  man  as 
th«  partially  developed  product  of  evolution  and  seeks  to 
show  him  as  an  individual  and  as  a  race  what  possibil- 
ities nature  has  in  store  for  him;  and  if  there  be  an  after 
life,  how  the  present  life  may  be  best  lived  as  a  prelimi- 
nary to  that.  Hedonism  is  obliged  to  draw  upon  all  the 
other  sciences  for  its  material.**  In  fact  all  the  sciences 
are  but  the  more  or  less  systematic  efforts  of  man  to  find 
his  place  in  the  universe.^*  Among  the  sciences  which 
Hedonism  will  draw  most  from  are  the  sciences  of  the 
human  body,  its  health  and  ailments,  the  economic 
sciences,  or  the  sciences  of  satisfying  man's  needs,  and  the 
political  and  lej^al  sciences,  or  the  sciences  which  govern 
man's  actions  in  society,  For  evolutionary  Hedonism 
recognizes  that  man  is  by  nature  a  sociable  creature; 
that  each  tribe,  nation  or  people,  in  fact,  is  a  sort  of 
organism,  subject  to  definite  laws  of  growth  and  decay. 
The  welfare  of  the  individual  is,  therefore,  largely  a  func- 
tion of  the  organism  of  which  he  is  a  part;  thus  while  a 
wise  man  like  Socrates  or  Confucius  might  be  happy 
among  miserable  asiociates  he  could  be  much  happier,  if 
his  associates  were  also  wiser  and  happier.  Altruism,  or 
interest  in  the  welfare  of  others,  is  thus  to  a  large  ex- 
tent an  element  of  Hedonism. 

HI.    The  Strength  of  Hedonism. 

The  chief  theory  of  conduct  which  is  opposed  to 
Hedonism  is  intuitionism,  the  theory  of  duty  or  con- 
science. This  theory  looks  to  the  human  sentiments  for  a 
basis  for  activity.  We  are  to  be  guided  in  our  actions, 
not  by  their  experienced  consequences  on  ourselves  and 
others,  but  by  the  approving  or  disapproving  voice  of 
this  inward  monitor.  * 

Without  stopping  to  inquire  at  present  into  the 
origin  and  nature  of  this  inward  monitor,  we  find  on 
investigation  that  it  has  varied  enormously  in  different 
agei,  races,  localities  and  individuals.  Thus  we  find  that 
slavery  kas  met  with  almost  universal  approval  in  times 


^t%tftsQin,  SyMcsji  of  3lb)(^,  Introd. 
**W€bcr,  Hist.  Philos.,  p.  i. 


XM 


y 


SO 


A  Plea  for  Hedonism, 


A  Plea  for  Hedonism. 


Ml 


past,  beiDg  recogDized  in  the  sacred  books  of  the  Hebrews, 
Hindus,  Chinese,  Greeks  and  Egyptians,  and  being  prac- 
ticed to  a  greater  or  less  extent  by  all  nations.  At  the 
present  time  it  is  condemned  by  nearly  all  civilized  men. 
The  subjection  of  women  has  been  likewise  generally 
approved  and  practiced.  Only  in  the  most  recent  times 
and  among  the  most  developed  nations  has  woman 
begun  to  receive  the  same  treatment  as  man.  Even  at 
the  present  day  our  sense  of  duty  does  not  urge  us  to  give 
her  the  same  political  and  social  rights  that  men  possess. 
Custom  keeps  her  wages  lower  than  those  of  men  engaged 
in  precisely  the  same  work."  Again,  the  sense  of  duty  has 
not  prevented  the  basest  treatment  and  neglect  of 
children,  even  among  people  who  were  the  most  scrupu- 
lous, such  as  the  Puritans. 

Once  more,  the  caste  system  prevails  among  a  large 
proportion  of  mankind.  The  sense  of  duty  not  only  does 
not  require  members  of  the  higher  caste  to  treat  those  of 
a  lower  caste  as  their  equals,  but  on  the  contrary  pos- 
tively  forbids  such  treatment.  Nor  is  the  caste  system 
by  any  means  confined  to  Asia.  The  young  woman  who 
marries  b©low  her  station  in  Europe  or  America  loses 
caste  almost  as  surely  as  does  the  Hindu  belle.  The  very 
word  friendship  implies  a  broader  form  of  selfishness. 
One  is  expected  to  do  for  a  friend  what  he  would  not  do 
for  a  stranger  or  an  enemy.  Our  consciences  call  on  us  to 
help  a  friend  who  is  in  trouble;  while  they  are  not  much 
stirred  by  the  sufferings  of  Hindus  and  Chhiese,  unless 
their  sufferings  become  widespread  and  excessive.  The 
word  patriotism  likewise  implies  that  our  country  is  to 
be  preferred  to  other  countries.  Even  if  we  do  not  accept 
the  maxim,  *^Our  country,  right  or  wrong,"  we  are  apt  to 
be  strongly  biased  in  her  favor  in  case  of  rivalry  or 
conflict  with  other  countries. 

In  opposition  to  the  above  illustrations,'^  Paul  Janet 
and  others  seek  to  demonstate  a  general  uniformity  of 
opinion  in  all  ages  and  nations  on  moral  questions.    But 


the  cases  cited  by  them  se^n  to  diK>w  simply  thai  the 
universal  reasoning  and  sentient,  pleasure-pain  fa^culties 
of  mankind  have  led  them  gradually  to  learn  the  same 
facts  regarding  human  and  physical  nature,  and  to  adapt 
themselves  to  these  facts.  The  activities  necessary  to 
maintain  the  individual  and  the  race,  after  making  the 
necessary  allowances  for  differences  in  the  environment, 
must  be  more  or  less  similar  everywhere;  and  if  men  desire 
to  live  in  society,  certain  general  and  evident  rules  of  con- 
duct must  be  established  and  followed.  But  beyond  these 
apparent  and  fundamental  eases,  it  seems  impossible  to 
harmonize  the  moral  views  of  mankind.  For  in 
addition  to  the  cases  of  conflicting  consciences 
which  we  have  already  given,  we  have  other 
cases  of  a  much  more  radical  kind.  In  the  sexual  re- 
lations we  find  differences  in  opinion  the  most  remote.  To 
say  nothing  of  monogamy,  polygamy  and  polyandry,  such 
writers  as  Spencer,  Westermark  and  Sutherland  give 
instances  of  what  we  regard  as  looseness  of  sexual  pr£W5- 
tlce,  which  are  almost  inconceivable.  So  in  matters  of 
honesty  and  veracity,  we  find  that  among  many  nations, 
honesty  and  veracity  are  not  supposed  to  be  due  to  a 
foreigner.  Theft  from  a  stranger  and  even  from  a  neigh- 
bor was  applauded  not  only  in  ancient  Sparta,  but  in 
many  other  countries.  And  even  in  civilized  countries 
clever  dishonesty  and  deception  are  too  often  approved 
where  the  parties  are  very  unequally  situated:  for 
example  when  one  outwits  and  cheats  an  employer,  a 
great  corporation,  or  the  public  ofl^cers.  There  is  often  a 
feeling  of  approval  of  the  clever  urchin,  who  deceives  his 
teacher.  And  I  have  heard  old  soldiers  of  high  standing 
tell  with  evident  self-satisfaction  how  they  deceived  and 
defrauded  their  officers,  and  their  stories  were  approved 
by  their  audience.  The  most  intelligent  people  sometimes 
will  be  found  to  distinguish  between  lying  and  deceit. 
Many  a  man  who  would  suffer  torture  rather  than  lie 
verbally,  will  not  hesitate  to  deceive  by  actions." 

But  a  closer  examination  shows  us  that  the  sense  of 


»*See  Rejwrt  <rf  Coip.  of  Lfcbor,  Vol.  XI. 
^Theory  of  Morals,  Bk.  Ill,  ch.  4* 


"See  H.  Spencer,  Ethics  II,  §156;  also  The  Outlook,  Vol.  73,  p.  262-3. 


22 


A  Plea  tor  HedontBin, 


duty,  or  conscience  is  exceedingly  compliant  and  fl«ablt. 
It  gives  way  in  nearly  every  ins^nce  to  tbe  accepted 
religious  code.  Whatever  is  prescribed  by  the  accepted 
religion  is  approved  by  the  sense  of  duty.  This  accounts 
for  the  child-murders  so  common  among  heathen  tribes. 
The  tribes  of  ancient  I^alestine  laid  their  infants  in  the 
red-hot  arms  of  a  motallic  god.  The  Hindu  mother 
throws  her  babe  to  the  crocodile  and  even  Abraham  was 
ready  to  sacrifice  his  only  son  at  the  supposed  call  of 
deity.  But  the  sense  of  duty  bends  not  only  at  the  dic- 
tate of  religion,  but  afc  the  dictate  of  custom,  where 
custom  and  religion  d>  not  conflict.  Hence  the  most 
absurd  costumes  are  worn,  the  most  absurd  rites 
observed,  and  the  most  absurd  practices  maintained, 
simply  because  custom  has  established  them.  In  this  case 
the  sense  of  duty  requires  one  to  respect  public  opinion. 
This  opinion  is  vastly  stronger  among  the  uncivilized 
than  among  ourselves.  But  even  the  best  of  us  feel 
impelled  by  the  sense  of  duty  to  comply  with  the  customs 
in  force  around  us. 

Once  more,  the  sense  of  duty  usually  complies  with  the 
existing  laws,  in  so  far  as  they  do  not  conflict  with  our 

religious  beliefs. 

In  any  age  and  nation,  therefore,  we  may  expect  to 
find  the  general  conscience  or  sense  of  duty  pretty  clearly 
defined  by  the  prevailing  religious  code,  together  with  the 
accepted  customs  and  political  laws  in  force.  If  the  relig- 
ion is  false  and  maintains  pernicious  rites  and  doctrines, 
the  sense  of  duty  will  be  accordingly  perverted.  If  the 
customs  are  absurd  and  injurious,  the  political  laws  Illog- 
ical and  narrow,  the  keener  intellects  wfll  probably  strive 
very  gradually  to  modify  them  in  the  direction  of 
improving  the  social  welfare,  but  the  sense  of  duty  of  the 
multitude  will  always  lag  far  in  the  rear  of  the  car  of 
progress.  For  progress  is  usually  the  work  of  a  select 
few;  and  the  multitude  are  very  slow  to  perceive  the 
advantages  of  a  change  in  well  established  institutions." 
We  are  forced  to  the  conclusion,  therefore,  that  the 

*3ee  Bryce,  Studies  in  Hist,  and  Jurist— Obedience,  p.  463. 


A  Plea  lor  Hedonism, 


88 


sense  of  duty,  or  consci^Dce  is  not  a  safe  and  sufOkient 
guide  to  human  conduct. 

The  sentiments  play  an  extremely  important  part  in 
human  affairs;  but  we  cannot  safely  rely  on  them  as  the 
ultimate  criterion  of  the  rectitude  of  an  action  or  course 
of  conduct.  What  habit  does  for  one  in  matters  of  bodily 
action,  the  sentiments  do  for  him  in  matters  of  volition. 
Habit  permits  us  to  devote  the  mind  to  other  matters 
while  the  body  carries  out  a  given  line  of  conduct.  So 
the  sentiments  dispense  with  the  necessity  of  going  back 
to  first  principles  before  deciding  on  every  act.  They  are 
moral  habits,  nothing  more. 

If,  then,  intuitionism,  with  its  reliance  ©n  an  inward 
monitor,  is  unable  to  provide  an  ultimate  basis  for  human 
activity,  a  philosophy  of  conduct,  what  has  Hedonism  to 
offer  in  its  stead?  Wherein  lies  the  strength  of  Hedonism? 
We  must  admit  at  the  start  that  Hedonism  has  a  bad 
name.  Any  doctrine  which  advocates  selfishness  must 
expect  to  be  frowned  upon.  And  among  Christian 
peoples,  at  any  rate,  any  doctrine  based  on  pleasure  must 
likewise  expect  to  meet  strong  opposition.  Unless,  there- 
fore, the  Hedonist  can  make  out  a  strong  and  clear  case 
in  its  favor,  he  must  not  expect  any  mercy  at  the  hands 
of  his  opponents  and  critics.  More  than  this,  I  realize 
only  too  clearly  that  a  misunderptood  theory  of  pleasure 
might  cause  a  vast  deal  of  harm.  It  would  perhaps  be 
better  to  let  men  blunder  along  after  their  old  guides  than 
to  have  them  think  they  need  no  guide  at  all;  that  they 
are  at  liberty  to  do  as  they  please,  and  to  gratify  every  de- 
sire and  passion  as  it  arises.  It  is  incumbent  on  the  Hed- 
onist to  guard  by  every  possible  precaution  against  any 
such  misconception  of  his  doctrine.  Hedonism,  as  I  under- 
stand the  doctrine,  seeks  to  establish  a  philosophical  basis 
for  conduct,  not  a  stronghold  for  the  libertine.  It  is  not 
intended  to  work  any  sudden  revolution  in  the  morals 
and  manners  of  civilized  men,  and  this  for  the  simple 
reason  that  in  spite  of  their  erroneous  theories  of  the 
ultimate  bases  of  conduct  and  of  certain  details  of 
activity,  civilized  peoples  have  unconsciously  followed 
hedonistic  principles  in  their  development.    They   have 


24 


A  Plea  for  Reaoniam. 


A  Plea  for  Hedonism, 


B5 


bufided  better  than  they  knew.  The  canon  of  oonse- 
quences  has  been  aeceptc  d  and  followed  to  some  extent  in 
all  ages  and  nations,  But  other  theories  have  often 
greatly  retarded  its  ap[)lication,  even  to  the  extent  of 
destroying  great  nations.  The  nations  which  have  sur- 
vived  and  progressed  are,  1  believe,  those  which  have 
grasped  most  firmly  and  applied  most  faithfully  the  canon 
of  consequences.  As  I  h  we  tried  to  point  out  in  the  first 
section,  it  was  largely  because  the  ancient  Greeks  were 
untrammelled  by  any  religious  code  that  they  were  able  to 
make  the  freest  use  of  tie  canon  of  consequences.  Thus 
they  were  able  to  develop  the  most  accurate  and  valuable 
moral  theory  which  the  world  knew  before  the  present 
age,  and  by  its  use  to  reach  the  highest  pinnacle  of  civili- 
zation. I  cannot  agree  vvith  Mr.  Spencer  m  hishidictment 
of  Greek  civilization."  The  Hindu  and  the  Chinaman,  on 
the  contrary,  tied  themselves  hand  and  foot  with  strin- 
gent religious  and  social  codes. 

Hedonism,  therefore,  is  evolutionary,  rather  than 
revolutionary.  It  conciires  that  there  are  vastly  higher 
and  broader  stages  of  civilization  yet  m  itore  for  human- 
ity;  but  it  does  not  hope  to  attain  these  by  any  sudden 
leap.  It  will  have  done  enough  if  it  enables  the  car  of 
civilization  to  move  steadily  onward  and  upward. 

Yet  at  the  present  time,  when  the  ethical  problem, 
that  is,  the  question  iia  to  the  ultimate  foundation  of 
moral  conduct,  is  studied  and  discussed  as  it  never  was 
before,  it  seems  well  worth  while  to  help  all  one  can  in 
reaching  a  solution  of  the  problem. 

In  the  first  place,  then,  Hedonism  is  irreconcilably 
opposed  to  every  form  of  asceticism,  that  is,  to  pain  for 
the  sake  of  pain.  Nearly  all  the  religious  and  ethical 
systems  of  the  past  have  been  vitiated  by  the  taint  of 
asceticism.  This  is  not  the  place  to  inquire  into  the 
origin  of  the  monstrous  notion  that  the  Deity  could  take 
delight  in  the  sufferings  of  his  creatures.  It  is  suflacient 
for  our  purpose  to  call  attention  to  the  important  place 
which  this  belief  occupies  in  most  religious  systems.    The 

»Ethics.  II.  J  58. 


rtfigious  aiid  ethiccd  systems  of  western  Asia  aoid  Etapope 
seem  to  have  drawn  their  ascetic  element  from  Egypt, 
where,  according  to  Schaff,'°  a  pessimistic  atmosphere 
seems  always  to  have  prevailed.  Christianity  has  not 
escaped  the  taint.  In  spite  of  the  humane  teachi&gs  of 
Jesus,  the  Egyptian  influence  was  strong  enough  to  fill 
the  symbols  of  the  church  with  ascetic  doctrines  and  all 
Europe  with  monks  and  monasteries. 

Hedonism  insists  that  men  have  a  right  to  be  happy, 
that  pain  is  intended  to  benefit  and  not  to  torture,  that 
the  religious  or  ethical  doctrine  demanding  suffering  or 
sacrifice  that  does  not  result  in  a  greater  compensating 
good  to  the  sufferer  or  some  other  sentient  creature,  is 
certainly  erroneous. 

Asceticism  is  unreasonable  and  cannot  Justify  itself. 
Yet  the  ascetic  element  in  various  guises  is  really  what 
makes  most  other  ethical  systems  different  from  Hedonism. 
Thus  it  is  this  element  of  asceticism  which,  sometimes 
drawing  strength  from  the  doctrine  of  self-discipline  or 
stoicism,  constitutes  the  essence  of  all  the  doctrines  of 
despair,  such  as  Buddhism.  The  ethics  of  despair  may  be 
hedonistic  if  it  avoids  this  ascetic  element.  For  if  the 
powers  of  evil  really  are  stronger  in  the  universe,  then 
doubtless  we  are  justified  in  seeking  Nirvana  or  some 
other  escape  into  non-existence.  But  we  are  still  at 
liberty  to  reinvestigate  the  facts  of  nature  for  the  pur- 
pose of  deciding  whether  existence  is  on  the  whole  too 
painful  to  be  endurable.  There  was  but  little  of  the 
ascetic  element  in  the  stoicism  of  Greece  and  Kome.  But 
when  the  current  of  orientalism  struck  the  philosophy  of 
Greece,  the  ascetic  element  mingled  with  the  philosophic 
and  pain  for  the  sake  of  pain  became  a  prominent  element 
in  the  ethical  doctrines  of  the  middle  ages. 

Preserved  by  the  religious  orders  against  the  strong 
recMjtion  of  German  common  sense  which  swept  over 
western  Europe  with  the  spread  of  German  civilization, 
asceticism  sprang  again  into  prominence  at  the  reforma- 
tion in  the  Puritanism  of  England  and  Germany.    During 

•oChiircli  History. 


K 


A  Plea  tor  Eedonism, 


A  Plea  for  Hedonism, 


ST 


the  last  three  centuries  men  have  been  graduallj  elimi- 
nating the  ascetic  element  from  the  religious  and  ethical 
systems  of  Europe.  The  reaction  probably  reached  flood 
tid*  in  the  days  of  William  Paley  and  Jeremy  Bentham. 
Since  their  day  there  has  been  a  slight  disposition  to 
revert  toward  asceticism,  owing  partly  to  the  writings  of 
Thomas  Carlyle  and  partly  to  disappointment  of  the 
hopes  placed  in  the  political  and  social  reforms  of  the 
nineteenth  century. 

Asceticism  draws  a  certain  amount  of  strength  from 
the  evident  value  of  self-discipline.  But  asceticism,  or 
pain  for  its  own  sake,  and  self-discipline,  or  pain  for  the 
sake  of  compensating  good  to  self  or  others  are  radically- 
different.  Self-discipline  is  a  hedonistic  doctrine.  Exper- 
ience teewjhes  the  value  of  discipline  as  clearly  as  it  teaches 
the  absurdity  of  asceticism.  But  too  often  the  one  is 
taken  for  the  other.  Suffering  to  produce  good  for 
another  is  confused  with  suffering  that  another  is  sup- 
posed to  enjoy  as  suffering.  It  is  a  curious  fact  in  nature 
that  sentient  creatures  are  unquestionably  able  to  enjoy 
the  agony  of  their  fellow  creatures.  By  a  natural  infer- 
ence, one's  deity  is  supposed  to  possess  this  same  abnor- 
mal characteristic.  But  of  all  illogical  and  abhorrent 
emotions,  this  one  seems  to  be  unquestionably  the  worst. 
Hedonism  insists  that  no  being,  be  he  creator  or  creature, 
has  the  right  to  enjoy  the  pain  of  another. 

Whatever  destiny  the  powers  of  the  universe  have  in 
store  for  me,  I  have  certainly  the  right,  in  so  far  as  I  have 
the  power,  to  make  that  destiny  as  little  painful  and  as 
fully  pleasant  as  possible.  And  the  same  right  which  I 
insist  upon  for  myself,  I  insist  upon  with  equal  emphasis 
for  my  fellowmen. 

In  the  next  place,  Hedonism  is  the  natural  doctrine  of 
conduct.  All  sentient  creatures  seek  pleasure  and  avoid 
pain  as  naturally  and  as  certainly  as  water  seeks  its  level. 
Indeed,  the  tendency  to  seek  pleasure  and  avoid  pain  is  so 
strong  and  natural  that  an  opposite  doctrine  seems 
almost  inconceivable.  Hence  not  only  many  philosophers 
but  even  whole  nations,  as  the  Hindus,  believe  that  sen- 
tience and  activity  are  inseparably  connect-ed  by  the  law  of 


cause  and  effect.  But  without  admitting  this  extreme  view, 
we  must  concede  a  natural  disposition  or  tendency  in  all 
conscious  beings  to  seek  pleasure  and  avoid  pain.  More- 
over, science  seems  to  indicate  that  pleasure  and  pain  are 
teleological,  that  is,  they  play  an  important  part  in  the  pres- 
ervation and  evolution  of  both  the  individual  and  the 
race.  No  one  will  deny  that  without  the  faculties  of 
pleasure  and  pain  no  living  creature  could  maintain  its 
existence  very  long.  Sentience,  or  pleasure-pain  is  the 
faculty  which  enables  a  living  creature  to  maintain  the 
equilibrium  with  its  environment  which  is  essential 
to  life.  And  pleasure,  usually,  if  not  always  indicates 
that  the  equilibrium  is  satisfa»ctory,  while  pain, 
usually,  if  not  always,  indicates  that  something 
is  wrong.  If  one  were  disposed  to  argue,  therefore, 
that  man  is  the  creation  of  an  intelligent  being,  the  exis- 
tence of  these  wise  provisions  for  his  persistence  among  the 
struggling  forces  of  the  universe  would  certainly  be  a 
strong  point  in  his  favor.  But  whether  the  gift  of  an 
intelligent  Creator,  or  the  product  of  chance,  pleasure  and 
pain  are  certainly  indispensible  faculties  of  all  sentient 
creatures.  And  even  if  we  can  never  demonstrate  that 
conscious  existence  was  intended  to  be  as  pleasant  as  poss- 
ible,  or  that  the  individual  may  strive  to  make  it  as 
pleasant  as  possible,  we  are  at  least  certain  that  without 
the  pleasure-pain  apparatus,  conscious  creatures  could 
not  subsist  at  all.  Pleasure  being,  then,  such  an  insepar- 
able accompaniment  of  healthy,  normal  consciousness, 
and  pain  as  clearly  the  index  of  the  abnormal  and  defec- 
tive, is  not  the  burden  on  the  opponents  of  Hedonism  to 
show  that  sentience  should  not  be  taken  as  the  ultimate 
guide  to  conduct?  As  we  have  repeatedly  indicated 
above,  sentience  alone  would  not  be  a  sufficient  guide  to 
conduct,  from  the  fact  that  man  is  an  exceedingly  com- 
plex being,  full  of  conflicting  desires  and  emotions. 
Keason,  therefore,  must  stand  as  judge  among  the  pleas- 
ure-pains  and  determine  which  are  entitled  to  recognition 
as  components  of  the  sum  total  of  pleasurable  conscious- 
ness and  whieh  should  be  rejected  as  injurious  to  the 
sentient  community. 


2S 


A  Pha  ioT  Hedonism, 


i; 


.11 


To  the  question:  Why  has  Hedonism  a  bad  name? 
we  answer:  Because  men  see  that  the  pleasure  seeker  so 
often  comes  to  grief  and  makes  himself  and  others  miser- 
able.   Ignorance  and  folly  too  often  misguide  men  in  the 
search  for  happiness.    Hence  the  advocate  of  Hedonism 
cannot  repeat  too  frequently  that  sentience  alone  cannot 
be  relied  upon  as  a  guide  to  conduct.    But  neither  must 
this  statement  be  misconstrued  or  misquoted.    For  after 
€dl,  reason  must  rely  on  sentience  as  the  test.    But  it  is  the 
course  of  sentience,  the  sum  of  pleasures  or  whatever  one 
may  call  the  total  make-up  and  summary  of  a  complete 
conscious    existence,  considering    both    its    quality,  or 
breadth,  its  intensity  or  depth  and  its  duration  or  length 
which  reason  must  direct  and  govern.    The  reader  will  see 
the  difficulty  of  translating  sentient  ideas  into  terms  of 
space  and  quantity.    Yet  I  doubt  not  that  he  will  under- 
stand what  I  mean.    Another  reason  for  this  ill-repute  of 
Hedonism  is  the  fact  that  it  is  often  mistakenly  supposed 
to  be  opposed  to  self-restraint  and  self-discipline.    But 
philosophic  Hedonism,  as  we  have  said  again  and  again,  is 
in  the  fullest  aiccord  with  all  legitimate  self-discipline. 
If  we  always  remember  therefore  that  the  aim  and  end  of 
Hedonism  is  to  secure  the  richest,  fullest,  deepest,  purest, 
longest,  pleasant  consciousness   for  the  individual,  we 
shall  not  be  confused  or  misled  by  instances  of  blind  and 
foolish  pleasure-seeking,  with  their  calamitous  and  repul- 
sive results  nor  by  any  unfair  comparisons  with  self-dis- 
ciplining ethical  regimes.    Every  sentient  creature  desires 
pleasure,  or  happiness  as  well  as  escape  from  pain  and 
evil.      Hedonism  endeavors  to    help    him   obtain   these 
results  in  the  fullest  degree,  it  may  be  by  self-restraint  or 
it  may  be  by  self-culture  or  indulgence.    It  does  not  tell 
men:  You  must  do  thus  and  so;   it  simply  says:  If  you 
wish  a  given  result  you  may  obtain  it  in  a  certain  way. 
The  man  who  breaks  the  law  of  hedonism  will  call  himself 
a  fool.    And  most  men  would  rather  be  anything  else 
than  fools. 

Hedonism,  then,  is  the  only  natural  ethics,  the  only 
ethics  which  seeks  to  lead  and  guide  men  rather  than 
drive  them,  the  only  ethics  which  appeals  to  both  their 


A  Plea  ior  Hedonism, 


29 


emotions  and  their  reason,  their  whole  nature,  instead  of 
commanding  and  compelling  them. 

But  man  is  by  nature  a  social  creature.  He  prefers 
with  the  ant  and  many  higher  animals  to  live  in  groups. 
And  the  greater  his  development  and  intelligence  the 
larger  become  the  groups  in  which  he  lives.  But  group- 
life,  or  social-life  is  only  possible  under  certain  conditions 
and  only  enjoyable  to  those  endowed  with  the  social  or 
sympathetic  emotions.  The  individual  must  consent  to 
give  up  certain  pleasures  and  liberties,  must  submit  to 
certain  rules  and  restraints.  I  care  not  whether  you  pre- 
fer Hobbes'  theory  of  the  Original  State  of  War,  which 
drove  reasonable  men  into  society  as  the  lesser  of  two 
evils,  or  Rousseau's  theory  of  the  Social  Contract,  entered 
into  by  mutual  consent  for  the  sake  of  its  advantages,  or 
the  theory  of  a  divinely  instituted  state  with  the  place  of 
each  member  eternally  fixed  for  him,  or  the  theory  of  a 
state  slowly  evolved  by  natural  processes.  The  result  is 
the  same  in  the  end.  Social  life  means  the  yielding  up  of 
certain  liberties  and  pleasures  by  the  individual  which  he 
might  enjoy  if  he  lived  alone,  and  the  acquisition  of  cer- 
tain joys  and  comforts  which  the  anchorite  must  forego. 

Hedonism  can  be  applied  to  several  of  these  political 
theories.  But  in  any  given  society  the  thoughtful  indivi- 
dual submits  to  the  social  law,  be  it  political,  economical 
or  etiquetical,  because  the  advantages  to  himself  of  such 
submission  are  greater  than  the  disadvantages.  I  am 
aware  that  the  multitude  submit  to  social  rules  largely 
from  the  force  of  habit,  indolence,  reverence,  fear  and 
affection.^^  But  even  the  most  ignorant  man  has  a  vague 
idea  of  the  reasons  for  social  laws.  The  most  stupid  man 
has  an  occasional  brilliant  idea,  and  the  ferment  of  ideas 
in  the  multitude  will  in  time  seize  upon  the  beneficial 
social  principles  and  throw  out  the  defective  ones,  much 
as  the  fermentation  of  cider  throws  extraneous  matter  to 
the  top  of  the  cask.    The  popular  wisdom  is  thus  not 


^'See  Bryce,   Studies,   etc.,   IX  Obedience,  and  X,  The  Nature  of 
Sovereignty, 


so 


A  Plea  for  Hedomem. 


A  Plea  for  Hedonism, 


31 


ill 


entirely  to  be  despised,  especially  among  a  progressive 

people. 

Hedonism,  then,  is  the  logical  basis  of  all  prudent 
conduct,  whether  in  the  pursuit  of  knowledge,  of  health 
and  comfort,  of  family   affairs,  of   friendly   intercourse 
with  our  neighbors,  of  art  and  culture,  or  in  the  greater 
intercourse  which  makes  up  the  nation  and  the  family  of 
nations.     There  can  never  be  any  conflict  between  Hedon- 
ism and  the  sciences  and  arts.     All  the  sciences  and  arts 
are  the  hand-maidens  of  Hedonism.      Whatever  makes 
men  wiser,  stronger,  healthier,  richer,  more  industrious, 
more  friendly,  more  practical  and  enduring,  better  trained 
and  educated  for  the  struggle  with  nature,  their  environ- 
ment and  their  own  character  will  be  welcomed  by  the 
hedonist.      Whatever   on    the   other  hand,  makes  men 
ignorant,  weak,  sickly,  poor,  lazy,   ill-natured,   stupid, 
boorish,  narrow,  mean,  unfriendly,  harsh,  reckless  or  in 
any  other  way  retards  progress  and  enlightenment  is 
condemned  by  Hedonism.    Nor  is  there  anything  incon- 
sistent  in  this  position.    In  case  of  the  drunkard  and  the 
opium  fiend,  everybody  can  see  the  folly  of  his  course  of 
action.    But  in  these  other  cases  of  a  narrow  selfishness 
or  willfulness,  the  perversity  and   disadvantage   of  the 
course  is  only  not  so  apparent.  Every  man  desires  health 
and  strength,  vigor  and  skill.    If  men  disregard  the  laws 
of  health,  therefore,  it  is  either  through  ignorance   or 
though  a  weakness  of  the   will  brought  on  by  various 
causes.    Even  while  indulging  the  craving  for  drink  or  for 
morphine  the  drunkard  does  not  cease  to  regret  the  prob- 
ably ultimate  results  of  his  folly.    It  is  the  business  of 
Hedonism  to  persuade  men  to  discipline  themselves  not 
for  the  sake  of  discipline,  nor  to  gratify  the  whim  of  a 
superior,  but  for  their  own  good  and  greater  pleasure  in 

the  end. 

If  every  man  has  an  equal  right  to  seek  happiness  in 
his  own  way,  certain  logical  results  follow  which  it  is 
important  to  consider  in  this  place.  In  the  first  place,  it 
follows  that  in  one  sense  might  makes  right.  A  man  may 
do  what  he  likes  and  what  he  can.    But  other  men  may 


do  the  same;  and  it  follows  that  by  combination  the 
superior  number  may  restrain  the  inferior.  But  if  we 
were  to  stop  here  Hedonism  would  be  the  most  pernicious 
of  all  doctrines.  We  hasten  to  add,  therefore,  with  the 
apostle,  that  all  things  are  not  expedient.  What  one 
may  do,  and  what,  all  things  considered,  he  will  prefer  to 
do  are  very  different.  Thus,  it  is  in  my  power  to  destroy 
my  furniture,  to  mistreat  my  dog  and  my  child,  to  be 
harsh  with  my  wife  and  surly  with  my  friends;  but  exper- 
ience teaches  me  that  these  things  are  not  expedient. 
And  if  my  nature  has  been  properly  developed,  they  are 
undesirable  and  repugnant  to  me.  Kindness,  affection 
and  friendliness  pay  better  in  the  long  run.  Hedonism 
urges  men,  therefore,  to  the  most  careful  study  of  the 
whole  situation.  Right  is  not  what  one  is  able  to  do,  but 
rather  what  one  who  is  normally  developed  prefers  to  do 
and  must  do  to  attain  his  greatest  welfare,  that  is,  his 
fullest  sentient  consciousness. 

It  also  follows  from  the  principle  of  the  equal  right  of 
all  to  itrive  for  their  own  greatest  good,  that  each  man 
may  join  in  the  restraint  of  his  fellow-men  where  their 
actions  interfere  with  his  welfare.  But  this  doctrine  is 
also  likely  to  be  misunderstood.  As  stated  above,  it  is  an 
empty  formula.  The  individual  should  still  inquire  into 
ultimate  results.  Such  an  inquiry,  the  Hedonist  claims, 
will  show  that  the  welfare  of  the  normal  individual  is 
nearly  always  identical  with  that  of  the  group.  Admit- 
ting that  there  are  rare  cases  where  social  welfare  and 
individual  welfare  appear  not  to  coincide  as  the  world  and 
the  individual  are  now  made  up,  yet  the  hedonist  insists 
that  in  the  long  run  the  good  of  the  state  and  that  of  the 
individual  are  identical.  Thus  utilitarianism  is  a  branch 
of  Hedonism.  For  in  striving  for  the  greatest  good  of  the 
greatest  number  (the  formula  of  utilitarianism),  the 
individual  feels  sure  that  indirectly  he  is  promoting  his 
own  welfare. 

It  will  readily  be  seen  from  what  has  already  been 
said  that  Hedonism  is  not  only  superior  to  other  ethical 
systems  in  its  appeal  to  men's  natural  inclinations  and 


g^jg^F 


32 


A  Plea  for  Hedonism. 


A  Plea  lor  Hedoniem, 


38 


i 


emotions,  but  that  it  has  the  advantage  of  appealing  to 
their  reason  and  experience  as  well,  and  is  thus  the  only 
progressive  ethics.  A  moral  system  which  rests  on  men's 
sentiments,  on  custom  or  on  some  vague  metaphysical  prin- 
ciple, such  as  the  doctrine  of  the  everlasting  and  immut- 
able right,  tends  to  become  more  and  more  rigid  and 
stationary.  Thus  the  Hindus,  with  their  complicated  Brah- 
minical  law,  are  shut  off  from  all  opportunity  of  advance 
in  civilization.  The  Chinese,  likewise,  with  the  Confucian 
doctrines  and  customary  morality  have  been  stationary 
in  civilization  for  two  thousand  years.  The  ancient  Jew, 
through  a  misinterpretation  of  the  Mosaic  law,  or  a 
defect  in  that  law,  was  excluded  from  all  progress  in  art 
and  culture.  So  during  the  middle  ages  theological  ethics 
hindered  the  progress  of  art,  science  and  commerce  in  end- 
less ways.  Who  can  say  how  much  higher  civilization 
would  be  now  if  women  had  enjoyed  the  same  freedom 
since  the  beginning  of  the  christian  era  that  they  enjoy  in 

America  today? 

These  instances  will  show  the  importance  of  having  a 
moral  principle  which  encourages  instead  of  retarding 
science  and  culture.  That  other  moral  theories  have  con- 
structed lofty  ideals,  the  hedonist  is  ready  enough  to 
admit.  Buddha,  Confucius,  Zarathustra,  and  Kant  were 
all  high-minded  and  noble  men.  But  in  so  far  as  they 
based  their  moral  systems  on  false  principles,  they  were 
the  means  of  retarding  rather  than  improving  the  condi- 
tion of  the  people. 

Buddhism  is  rich  in  noble  maxims  of  conduct.  But  as 
a  whole  it  Is  probably  worse  that  no  system  at  all. 
Zarathustra  and  Confucius  tauglit  many  wholesome  doc- 
trines, but  taken  as  a  whc4e,  their  systems  have  retarded 

civilization. 

So  the  formalism  of  Kant  might  be  safe  enough  in  an 
age  where  each  of  the  virtues  had  a  well  settled,  practical 
meaning  for  the  individual;  and  where  the  duty  to 
parents,  to  children,  to  neighbors  and  to  the  state  were 
well  recognized.  But  the  fact  that  they  were  settled 
wouM  make  change  all  the  more  difficult  if  any  formal- 
theory  of  ethics  were  adopted.    ''So  act  that  the  maxim 


of  your  conduct  may  be  adopted  as  a  universal  law" 
becomes  dangerous  among  a  people  who  are  settled 
in  their  customs.  For,  as  was  pointed  out  above,  the 
sentiments  of  the  individual  are  almost  certain  to 
approve  the  existing  regime.  And  when  a  more  vigorous 
thinker  appears,  who  sees  the  injurious  effects  in  terms  of 
welfare,  of  existing  practices,  he  meets  with  universal 
opposition  from  all  the  advocates  of  formalism. 

In  the  next  place,  we  notice  that  Hedonism  is  not  only 
the  natural,  logical  and  progressive  ethics.    We  find  that 
it  has  been  the  actual  element  of  value  in  all  the  great 
ethical  systems  of  the  past.    From  the  very  awakening 
of    intelligence,    sentient,    conscious  beings    must  have 
begun  to  study  the  consequences  of  actions,  along  with 
the  laws   of  nature   and   of   the    human   constitution. 
Conduct    which    is    guided    by    consequences    is   called 
prudent.    Most  conduct  of  this  kind  has  become  so  much 
a  matter  of  course  that  we  have  long  since  ceased  to 
think  of  it  as  having  any  ethical  quality  whatever.    And 
it  is  very  common  for  moralists  to  exclude  all  prudent 
activity  from  the  field  of  ethics,  or  at  the  most  to  give 
ft,  but  a  passing  glance.    Thus  Kant  insists  repeatedly 
that  all  conduct  \Nhich  is  induced  by  prudence  or  self- 
interest  must  be  excluded  from  the  field  of  ethics.    He 
would  investigate  the  field  of  disinterested  or  altruistic 
conduct  alone.     But  the   hedonist  maintains  not  only 
that    prudent  activity  is  a  very  important  branch  of 
ethics  but  that  in  the  actual  systems  of  the  past,  prudence 
has  been  the  vital  element.    Thus  every  moral  maxim 
which  appeals  to  one's  judgment  of  value  must  be  classed 
as  hedonistic.    When  Jesus  said:  "Come  unto  me,  all  ye 
that  labor  and  are  heavy  laden,  and  I  will  give  you  rest", 
he  was  appealing  to  the  sentient  nature  of  mankind.    So 
when  he  said,  **He  that  believeth  on  me  shall  be  saved; 
and  he  that  believeth  not  shall  be  damned".    So,  when  he 
said,  '*In  my  father's  house  are  many  mansions".    So 
the  whole  sermon  on  the  mount,  his  most  complete  dis- 
course>  is  entirely  hedonistic."    For  even  after  command- 

»*^Sce  Matth.  V;  3:  VII;  27. 


/ 


94 


A  Plea  for  Eeaonmm. 


ing  the  most  complete   systems  of  non-resistance  and 
altniism  which  has  ever  been  known«»  he  adds  in  verse  45, 
**That  ye  may  be  the  children  of  your  Father  which  is  in 
heaven''.    The  sermon  opens  with  the  blessings  which  are 
to  fall  on  those  who  accept  and  follow  the  doctrines  of  the 
sermon.    And  then  it  closes^*  with  the  i-emarkable  parable 
of  the  wise  man  who  built  his  house  upon  a  rock  and  the 
foolish  man  who  built  on  the  sand.     Wisdom  and  folly 
are  the  watchwords  of  Hedonism.    Whether  we  hold  that 
accepting  the  doctrines  of  Jesus  makes  a  man  happier  or 
not  in  this  life,  there  is  no  question  that  Jesus  meant  to 
to  teach  that  his  followers  should  have  an  exceeding  great 
reward  when  He  came  in  His  glory.   He  went  about  doing 
good,  not  merely  good  in  the  abstract,  not  merely  preach- 
ing  good  sermons,  but  practical,  hedonistic  good.     He 
healed  the  sick,  made  the  blind  see;  caused  the  lame  to  walk, 
cured  insanity,  raised  the  dead,  and  even  gladdened   the 
hearts  of  the  wedding  guests  with  excellent  wine.     All 
through  his  ministry,  Jesus  appealed  to  men's  sentient  na- 
ture.   He  reasoned  with  them;  he  pointed  to  their  misery, 
discord  and  empty  formalism,  and  urged  them  to  turn  to  a 
reasonable  course  of  life.     And  whether  we  accept   his 
teaching  as  divine  or  merely  human,  we  must  admit  that 
he  points  out  the  value  of  altruistic  conduct  for  the  mdi- 
vidual  as  no  one  else  has  done  before  or  since.    I  do  not 
mean  to  say  that  there  were  no  other  important  elements 
in  the  teaching  of  Jesus.    That  teaching  was  religious  as 
well  as  ethieal.    We  must  also  admit  that  an  element  of 
asceticism  is  to  be  found  in  the  doctrines  of  Jesus  as  they 

coii\e  down  to  us. 

More  tender  than  stoicism  and  more  vigorous  than 
epicureanism,  the  ethieal  doctrines  of  Jesus  have  done  a 
great  deal  toward  the  spreading  of  Christianity  through- 
out the  world. 

The  whole  Jewish  system  of  ethics  is  hedonistic.  Even 
where  its  demands  are  given  as  th©  dictates  of  God,  they  are 
coupled  more  or  less  directly  with  the  threats  and  prom- 

*^v.  33-^44. 

=**V1I;  a4— 27. 


A  Plea  for  Hedonism, 


35 


ises  of  Jahveh.  It  is  true  that  the  philosophic  element  was 
not  prominent  in  the  Jewish  code.  The  rites  and  cere- 
monies are  to  be  observed  and  performed  because  God  has 
so  commanded.  The  reward  was  to  be  directly  bestowed 
by  him,  not  as  the  natural  consequence  of  obedience,  but 
as  a  token  of  merit.  But  the  formal  code  of  conduct  was 
too  firmly  instated  by  priest,  levite  and  people  to  be 
shaken  by  the  thundering  arguments  of  Isaiah  or  the 
plaintive  discourses  of  Jeremiah.  But  after  all  the  Law  of 
Moses  was  full  of  wise,  hedonistic  principles;  with  some  ex- 
ceptions it  was  equitable,  just  and  wise.  The  land-owner, 
the  debtor,  the  widow,  the  orphan,  the  criminal,  and  even 
the  stranger  were  wisely  dealt  with.  The  criminal  law  was 
comparatively  mild,  the  law  of  torts  not  too  severe.  The 
laws  of  marriage  and  divorce  were  among  the  best  of 
ancient  times  and  we  know  from  history  that  Jewish 
family  life  was  remarkably  clean  and  high-toned. 

Confucius,  too,  adopted  a  hedonistic  theory  of  ethics. 
His  theory  was  more  philosophical  than  that  of  the  early 
Jews.  He  gave  more  reasons  for  the  conduct  which  he 
prescribed;  that  is,  he  pointed  out  the  value  of  the  con- 
duct. Confucius,  like  Socrates,  taught  that  morals  and 
manners  must  begin  with  self  knowledge.  And  while  pre- 
scribing a  minutely  detailed  code  of  action  for  the  indi- 
vidual, which  in  the  end  became  an  incubus  on  Chinese 
civilization,  yet  his  studies  led  him  to  see  that  altruism  is 
only  a  wiser  Hedonism;  and  while  rejecting  all  religion  he 
announced  the  same  fundamental  rule  of  conduct  which 
Jesus  preecribed,  500  years  later,  in  the  Golden  Rule. 
Had  Confucius  been  succef'ded  by  thinkers  as  bn^ad  as 
himself,  who  could  ha\^  put  life  into  his  moral  system^ 
China  might  have  made  wonderful  progress  in  civiliza- 
tion. Unfortunately,  no  ruler  would  accept  his  system  of 
government;  his  disciples  devoted  themselves  to  the  letter 
of  the  law,  and  China  became  ensnared  in  an  impenetrable 
wilderness  of  formalism. 

Zarathustra,  too,  the  moral  and  religious  law-giver  of 
the  Persians,  adopted  hedonistic  principles.  Two  great 
betqgs,  the  o^  li^t  or  good,  and  th^  othger  daj*kj(es8,  dr 
evil,  have  been  engaged  in  aatruggle  for  supremacy  from 


// 


ii 


/ 


36 


A  Plea  ioT  Hedoniem. 


all  eternity.  But  the  good  being  is  on  the  side  of  the 
welfare,  or  good  of  the  individual;  the  evil  or  dark  being 
is  constantly  endeavoring  to  injure  mankind.  In  the  end 
the  good  will  triumph  and  those  who  are  on  his  side  will 
receive  their  reward.  Zoroastrianism  has  many  wise 
hedonistic  maxims  and  principles,  tending  to  promote  the 
welfare  of  the  individual  and  society. 

Buddha,  likewise,  was  a  moral  reformer.  And  like 
most  moral  reformers,  he  was  stirred  to  thought  and 
activity  by  the  misery  and  wretchedness  which  he  saw 
around  him.  After  devoting  many  years  to  the  study  of 
the  problem  of  evil,  he  reached  the  conclusion  that  happi- 
ness consists  in  Nirvana,  or  perfect  peace.  But  the  peace 
of  Buddhism,  while  it  frees  one  from  suffering  and  is  thus 
hedonistic,  is  almost  the  peace  of  non-existence.  Never- 
theless, all  the  doctrines  of  Buddha  are  based  on  the 
fundamental  idea  of  escaping  from  sentient  evil.  The 
prescibed  course  of  conduct  is  directed  entirely  toward  the 
attainment  of  Nirvana,  or  escape  from  suffering.  The 
fact  that  Buddha  and  Confucius  were  unable  to  point  to  a 
larger  hope  in  the  life  beyond,  as  did  Socrates  and  Jesus, 
does  not  militate  against  our  argument.  Their  doctrine 
was  negatively  hedonistic,  while  the  doctrines  of  Jesus  and 
Socrates  are  both  positively  and  negatively  hedonistic. 

Buddha,  like  Confucius  and  Zarathustra,  studied  the 
consequences  of  actions  and  with  an  endless  prolixity  of 
formal  details,  he  mingles  wise,  hedonistic  principles  of 
conduct,  based  on  the  observation  of  human  society, 
human  greed  and  human  frailty.  Overburdened  with  the 
sense  of  the  wretchedness  which  all  the  watchfulness  of  his 
guardians  could  not  conceal  from  him,  he  left  his  princely 
home  to  study  in  peace  and  quiet  the  problem  of  evil. 
Like  Moses  and  Confucius,  he  returned,  fertile  in  plans  for 
improving  the  welfare  of  his  fellowmen.  His  theory  of  life 
was  more  spiritual  than  that  of  Confucius,  but  the  prob- 
lem  which  he  was  trying  to  solve  was  precisely  the  same: 
to  wit,  the  problem  of  human  misery  and  human  happi- 
ness. 

I  spok©  above  of  popular  wisdjom.    This  wtedonl  is  set 
forth  among  every  people  in  tie  form  of  proverbs  aUd 


A  Plea  for  HedoDwm. 


37 


fabtee..  TlMwfe  proverbs  and  fables  embody  the  condGWifed 
and  pithily  expressed  experience  of  the  race.  Prof.  Legge 
says  that  for  centuries  the  Chinaman  has  been  largely 
guided  in  the  conduct  of  his  life  by  the  excellent  maxims 
of  Confucius.  Jewish  literature,  too,  is  rich  in  proverbs. 
The  same  is  true  of  the  Arabic,  a  near  relative  of  the 
Hebrew.  Among  savage  tribes  the  philosophy  of  life  is 
usually  embodied  in  familiar  proverbs,  which  are  passed 
from  mouth  to  mouth  and  from  father  to  son.  Originat- 
ing as  they  do  and  passing  from  country  to  country, 
these  sayings  are  often  couched  in  the  most 
contradictory  terms,  and  embody  the  most  conflicting 
theories  of  life.  But  a  careful  study  of  them  will  show 
that  they  are  drawn  from  a  more  or  less  rich  experience, 
and  that  they  are  all  based  on  hedonistic  principles. 
Frequently  they  prescribe  rules  of  conduct  for  the  indi- 
vidual which  are  apparently  injurious  to  him,  and  yet 
they  are  accepted  as  a  part  of  the  prudential  philosophy 
of  the  tribe.  For  example,  ''Honesty  is  the  best  policy," 
announces  the  result  of  a  large  experience  in  dishonesty  by 
the  whole  race.  Its  truth  is  often  hard  to  realize,  yet 
many  a  man  has  been  governed  by  this  simple  maxim 
when  conscience,  the  sense  of  duty,  and  the  fear  of  Grod 
were  unable  to  control  his  actions.  Men  who  were  unable 
to  comprehend  the  reasonings  of  Isaiah  and  Socrates 
could  lay  up  in  memory  the  maxims  of  Solomon  and  the 
fables  of  ^^sop.  And  there  is  reason  to  believe  that  the 
modern  Englishman,  German,  or  American  is  more  influ- 
enced by  the  proverbs  in  which  our  languages  are  so  rich, 
than  he  is  by  the  subtle,  metaphysical  doctrines  of  Kant 
and  Martineau,  Luther  and  Edwards. 

But  all  proverbial  philosophy  is  professedly  a  pruden- 
tial philosophy.  It  tells  the  individual  what  his  prede- 
cessors have  found  most  profitable  in  life.  It  gives  him 
the  benefit  of  their  experiences;  condenses  into  a  line  for 
him  the  biography  of  a  race.  Proverbial  philosophy  is 
often  trustworthy,  too.  It  comes  with  no  ax  to  grind, 
no  system  to  maintain,  no  party  to  support.  Like  the 
pebble  on  the  river  beach,  it  comes  from  no  man  knows 
where;  and,  like  the  pebble,  it  has  been  tossed  and  tried 


•u 


II'a. 


38 


A  Plea  for  Hedonism, 


A  Plea  lor  Hedomism. 


89 


I 

1 


uflfefl  it  is  worn  smooth  and  perfect.  Hence  the  prov^Ste 
ial  philosophy  of  any  people  is  well  worthy  of  study. 
These  gems  of- thought,  these  heirlooms  of  experience 
which  have  survived  tlie  mutations  of  kingdoms  and 
peoples  are  more  priceless  than  the  treasures  of  princes. 
And  what  is  the  burden  of  their  tale?  Is  not  their  united 
voice  to  the  effect  that,  '^Experience  is  the  best  teacher;" 
that  *'your  sin  will  find  you  out;"  that  'The  thief  will 
be  caught  in  his  own  trap;"  that  "One  lie  makes  two 
more  necessary;"  that  'If  you  cast  your  bread  upon  the 
waters  it  will  return  to  you  after  many  days;"  that  "He 
who  sows  the  wind,  will  reap  the  whirlwind"?  Chastity, 
honesty,  veracity,  merely,  bravery,  modesty,  industry, 
patience,  friendliness,  sbu,  or  reciprocity,  (the  golden 
word  of  Confucius),  are  all  based  on  sound  prudential 
reason.  The  experience  of  the  race  has  demonstrated  and 
in  these  proverbs  embodied  the  fact  that  these  virtues  are 
not  empty  forms,  not  incomprehensible  principles,  not  the 
dictates  of  a  whimsical  deity,  not  the  froth  of  an  evanes- 
cent sentiment,  but  that  they  are  the  rational  maxims  of 
a  happy  life,  the  fundamental  principles  of  a  moral  sciene 
base  on  human  nature  and  solicitous  for  human  welfare. 

But  not  only  have  the  professedly  ethical  theories 
which  have  had  the  most  widespread  influence  among 
mankind  drawn  theirmain  strength  from  their  hedonistic 
principles,  teachings,  threats  and  promises;  not  only  have 
the  popular  principles  of  conduct  and  theories  of  the 
destiny  of  man,  as  embodied  in  proverbs,  maxims  and 
omens,  accepted  Hedonism  as  the  ultimate  destiny  of  the 
race,  but  the  great  religious  systems  of  the  race,  which 
have  been  already  more  or  less  closely  associated  with  their 
ethical  principles  and  moralmaxims,  have  likewise  rested 
on  a  similar  basis.  Fear  and  hope  are  the  sentiments  to 
which  religion  has  always  appealed,  fear  of  present  •  or 
future  evil  or  suffering,  hope  of  future  peace  or  bliss. 
Sometimes  the  evil  to  be  escaped  and  the  reward  to  be 
obtained  was  expected  in  the  present  life,  sometimes  in 
a  more  or  less  definite  life  in  another  world,  sometimes,  as 
among  the  Buddhists,  the  Egyptians  and  some  of  the 
Greeks,  in  a  future  earthly  life  (Karma  transmigration); 


and  sometimes,  as  among  the  ancient  Jews,  id  tife  W^  of 
one's  descendants. 

Ancestor  worship  certainly  sprang  from  hecjonistic 
motives.  A  man  believed  in  a  more  or  less  vague  way 
that  the  spirits  of  the  departed  still  retained  power  for 
good  and  evil.  It  was  important,  therefore,  to  keep  in 
their  good  graces  by  offerings,  sacrifices  and  ceremonial 
attentions.  Where  ancestor  worship  prevails,  a  man's 
good  fortune  and  evil  fortune,  his  health  and  his  sickness, 
his  rich  harvests  and  his  famines,  his  good  luck  and  his 
accidents  are  attributed  to  the  good  or  ill  will  of  these 
ancestors.  Hence  ancestor  worship,  especially  among 
people  who  show  no  great  love  for  their  kindred  while 
they  are  on  earth,  is  purely  a  prudential  affair,  almost  a 
matter  of  business. 

And  among  the  idol  worshipers  it  is  very  common  to 
reproach  the  god  for  not  performing  his  part  of  the 
contract.  Sometimes  he  is  even  beaten,  or  mistreated  in 
other  ways  to  awaken  him  to  the  fact  that  where  he  has 
received  the  stipulated  offerings  and  sacrifices,  hje  should 
send  the  needed  blessings,  rain,  health,  good  crops,  game, 
or  whatever  it  may  be. 

Even  among  the  most  highly  civilized  Christians  this 
feeling  still  lingers.  The  man  who  goes  to  church 
regularly,  is  kind  to  his  family,  gives  to  the  poor,  treats 
his  neighbor  squarely,  is  apt  to  think  that  the  Lord 
should  prosper  him  and  to  feel  abused  if  his  crops  are 
bad,  his  children  are  sick,  or  especially  if  a  serious  acci- 
dent or  misfortune  befall  him. 

Hero  worship  is  even  more  clearly  hedonistic  than 
ancestor  worship.  For  the  affection  which  might  lead 
one  to  perform  certain  rites  in  memory  of  a  beloved 
parent  does  not  exist  toward  a  departed  king  or  ruler. 
One  may  be  devoted  to  a  good  ruler,  but  it  is  because 
that  ruler  has  proven  serviceable,  has  lightened  the  bur- 
den of  taxes,  driven  off  the  public  enemy,  punished  inter- 
nal disorder,  enforced  law  and  equity  among  his  subjects, 
and  broadened  the  opportunities  of  the  individual  to  lead 
a  happy  and  undisturbed  life.  It  is  the  belief  that  the 
wise  ruler  can  still  do  something  for  his  subjects   that 


u 


I 


ill 


40 


A  Plea  tor  Hedonism, 


leads  them  to  curry  favor  with  hfe  depaapl^  8^it.  It  is 
fear  of  the  despotic  ruler  that  leads  *o  the  effort  to 
appease  the  wrath  of  his  departed  spirit. 

I  have  already  spoken  of  Confucianism,  the  ethical 
religion  of  the  Chinese,  of  Buddhism,  the  religion  accepted 
by  so  many  millions  in  India  and  China,  and  of  the 
system  of  Zoroastriani sm,  the  religion  of  Persia.  All  of 
these  were  seen  to  rest  on  hedonistic  doctrines  and  prin- 
ciples. Judaism,  too,  v  as  a  hedonistic  religion.  The  Old 
Testament  is  full  of  thr  ^ats  and  promises.  And  the  most 
frequent  argument  of  the  religious  leaders  was  to  point 
to  the  hedonistic  results  of  obedience  and  disobedience. 
The  Jew  firmly  believe  d  that  the  conquests  and  other 
national  disasters  were  the  direct  result  of  unfaithfulness 
to  the  Mosaic  law,  and  that  the  restoration  and  preserva- 
tion of  the  remnant  was  due  to  their  repentance  and 
reformation.  Although  they  believed  themselves  to  be 
God's  favorite  and  peculiar  people,  they  did  not  expect 
him  to  favor  them  unl«  ds  they  faithfully  obeyed  his  com- 
mands; and  conversely,  if  they  were  obedient,  they 
expected  the  favor  of  heaven. 

The  Mohammedans  are,  if  possible,  even  more  hedon- 
istic and  practical  in  tht  ir  religious  beliefs  and  observances 
than  the  ancient  Jews.  Their  Grod  is  a  just  God;  and  by 
a  just  God,  they  mean  a  God  v.ho  stands  strictly  by  his 
contract.  Worship  him  according  to  his  commands  and 
he  will  bless  you  in  this  world  and  the  next.  Disobey  him 
and  he  will  punish  you  ia  this  life  and  damn  you  eternally 
in  the  next.  God  has  revealed  his  will,  his  promises  and 
his  punishments  in  the  Koran.  Follow  the  Koran,  and 
your  welfare  for  time  and  eternity  is  assured. 

I  have  already  spoken  of  the  ethical  system  of  Jesus. 
Christianity,  which  sprang  from  his  teachings  is  com- 
monly supposed  to  be  opposed  to  all  hedonistic  systems. 
It  is  supposed  to  be  a  religion  of  self-denial,  of  unselfish- 
ness, of  altruistic  conduct.  But  Christianity  is  the  child 
of  Judaism,  and,  as  1  showed  above,  Jesus  based  all 
his  arguments  on  hedonistic  principles.  The  selfishness 
which  Jesus  and  his  followers  condemn  is  the  narrow 
selfishness   which  in  the  end  is  not  truly  self -beneficial. 


A  Plea  for  Hedonism, 


41 


i'. 


Christianity  claims  to  save  m«a  not  only  freon  tb^ettrrBRl 
penalties  of  their  sins,  but  it  as  distinctly  offers  etenial 
happiness  to  those  who  accept  the  simple  plan  of  ealva- 
tion,  and  peace  that  passeth  understanding  throughout 
the  earthly  life.    The  self-denial  which  the  Christian  advo- 
cates can  be  accepted  by  the  consistent  hedonist,— at  any 
rate  when  coupled  with  the  blessings  held  out  by  Chris- 
tianity.   If  those  blessings   are  guaranteed,   the  most 
ardent  hedonist  will  admit  that  the  self-denial  is   worth 
while.    It  is  true  that  the  more  spiritual  Christians  profess 
to  base  their  doctrines  on  love  and  not  on  the  hope   of 
reward.    But  if  heaven  and  hell  were  cancelled  from  the 
doctrines  of  Christianity,  there  is  reason  to  fear  that 
there  would .  be  a  great  falling  off  in  the  number  of  Chris- 
tians.   A  few  high  spirits  may  find  Kant's  doctrine  of 
duty  and  the  doctrine  of  love  suflScient  sanctions  of  con- 
duct.   But  for  the  great  majority  of  mankind  duty  in  the 
abstract  and  love  in  the  abstract  would  prove  almost 
totally  worthless  as  sanctions  of  conduct.    Common  men 
must  have  a  sanction  of  a  more  practical  kind.    The  con- 
sequences of  conduct  must  be  kept  before  their  eyes. 

Even  the  force  of  habit,  even  the  strongest  religious 
beliefs,  will  not  hold  men  to  conduct  which  they  plainly 
see  it  is  to  their  interest  to  avoid.  And  if  the  promise  of 
inconceivably  rich  rewards  and  the  threats  of  inconceiv- 
ably awful  punishments  have  not  been  able  to  constrain 
men  to  obey  the  rules  of  Christianity  with  even  plausible 
strictness,  how  much  more  would  these  rules  be  neglected 
if  these  terrible  sanctions  were  abolished? 

One  feels  safe  in  saying  that  even  if  the  negative 
sanctions,  the  punishments,  were  abolished,  the  neglect  of 
Christianity  would  increase  m  a  marked  degree.  This,  too, 
not  only  in  spite  of  a  future  reward  but  in  the  face  of  the 
fact  that  Christianity  is  largely  based  on  philosophical 
hedonistic  principles.  The  reaction  would  be  due  to  the 
fact  that  too  many  people  accept  Christianity  through 
fear.  They  are  afraid  to  disobey.  They  have  not  grasped 
the  philosophy  of  conduct.  They  do  not  perceive  that 
Christianity  is  pointing  out  the  line  of  coaduct  which  is 
best  for  the  individual.     They  fe^l  that  they  must  be 


I    * 


ii* 


!li!^ 


42 


A  Plea  tor  Bedonism. 


A  Plea  lor  Hedonism. 


43 


I 


'*good'*  in  order  to^escape  b^  aad  doneeQtieatfy  '•^g(n>&^ 
ness"  is  always  a  burden  to  them.  Because  ^  is  forced  on 
them  they  dislike  it,  just  as  a  school  boy  dislikes  his 
studies.  The  same  state  of  facts  doubtless  exists  amonpj 
the  followers  of  all  religions.  Fear  and  not  reason  holds 
them  to  the  mark.  Here  and  there  a  thoughtful  individ- 
ual catches  a  glimpse  of  the  beauty  of  holiness,  of  the 
reasonableness  of  the  philosophy  of  the  prescribed  con- 
duct, (if  it  happens  to  be  reasonable  or  philosophical, 
which  too  often  is  not  the  case.)  But  the  masses  obey 
blindly  and  doggedly,  because  they  think  they  must. 

But  if  the  ethical  and  religious  thinkers  who  have  had 
the  greatest  influence  on  the  lives  and  conduct  of  their 
fellowmen  have  attained  this  result  by  an  appeal  to  the 
sentience  of  their  hearers,  and  by  a  demonstration  of  the 
personal  advantage  of  accepting  their  doctrines,  the 
political  and  economic  thinkers  have  still  more  plainly 
and  emphatically  appealed  to  prudential  reasons. 
Even  those  statesmen  who  have  insisted  most  strongly  on 
the  divine  origin  of  kings  and  other  institutions,  have 
felt  compelled  to  bolster  up  their  claims  by  sanctions  of 
a  sentient  nature,  that  is,  by  a  system  of  rewards  and 
punishments.  But  the  true  statesman,  tht  wise  ruler,  in 
all  ages  and  nations  has  had  the  welfare  of  the  people  at 
heart  and  has  sought  to  provide  the  political  and  eco- 
nomic institutions  which  would  best  promote  the  general 
welfare.  Whatever  additional  prerogatives  have  been 
claimed  for  the  state,  the  protection  of  the  citizen  from 
external  enemies,  the  suppression  of  crime,  the  mainten- 
ance of  good  order  and  justice  have  always  been  recog- 
nized as  falling  within  the  sphere  of  duties  or  rights  of  the 
ruler.  Moses  and  Manu,  Solon  and  Lycurgus,  Murna  and 
Justinian,  Washington  and  Gladstone  all  had  the  welfare 
of  the  people  at  heart.  It  is  true  that  the  glory  of  the 
state  has  sometimes  blinded  men's  eyes  to  the  needs  of 
the  people.  But  however  this  may  have  been,  it  is  now 
universally  admitted  that  the  ruler  should  constantly 
have  in  mind  the  welfare  of  the  people. 

Utility,  not  consistency  with  any  abstract  theory,  is 
the  modern  test  of  political  and  economic  science.    And 


in  the  political  systems  of  the  past,  it  was  ^e  ufl^ftH 
institutions  which  preserved  the  system*  and  made  them 
acceptable.  Take  the  Common  and  Statue  Law  of 
England.  It  was  not  its  theory  of  the  divine  rights  of 
kings,  its  subjection  of  women,  its  descent  by  primogeni- 
ture, its  aristocratic  electoral  system,  or  it«  state- 
supported  church  which  made  it  so  strong  and  so 
valuable.  Its  admirable  system  of  justice,  its  Magna 
Charta  and  Habeas  Corpus,  its  Court  of  Equity  and  House 
of  Commons,  and  above  all  its  constant  appeal  to 
sentient  facts  and  common  sense  were  its  real  strength 
and  grandeur. 

The  same  is  true  of  the  Roman  law,  from  w^hich 
English  law  drew  far  more  than  its  admirers  like  to 
admit.  The  exceeding  flexibility  of  both  these  systems, 
where  flexibility  permitted  improvement  in  the  interests 
of  the  general  welfare,  and  their  stern  inflexibility  where 
there  would  have  been  danger  to  the  public  or  the 
individual  good,  is  the  secret  of  their  inestimable  value. 
Unconsciously  resting  on  the  sound  good  sense  of  practi- 
cal men,  Roman  and  English  law^  are  living  monuments  of 
the  value  of  hedonism. 

But  the  case  for  Hedonism  grows  clearer  and  stronger 
as  we  proceed.  If  the  political  and  economic  systems  of 
the  world  which  have  proved  the  most  durable  and  excel- 
lent are  more  obviously  hedonistic  than  the  religious  and 
ethical  systems,  the  social  systems  of  the  progressive 
nations  show  still  more  clearly  the  marks  of  hedonism. 
This  subject  is  so  vast  that  one  can  do  little  more  than 
call  attention  to  its  more  salient  features. 

Questions  of  family  life,  of  education,  of  pauperism,  of 
the  helpless  and  disabled,  of  marriage  and  divorce,  of  the 
prevention  and  suppression  of-  vice,  of  amusements,  of 
health  and  disease,  trade,  commerce  and  science,  must  be 
determined  by  hedonistic  rules. 

The  first  requisite  of  the  continued  existence  of  the 
individual  and  of  the  race  is  the  observance  of  the  rules  of 
health.  No  one  will  claim  that  these  rules  can  be  deter- 
mined otherwise  than  by  experience,  that  is,  by  the  canon 
of  consequences.    The   final   purpose   of  man's   earthly 


44 


A  Plea  ior  Hedonism. 


A  Plea  for  Hedonism. 


46 


Bojourn  is  not  yet  poiitiftiy  kiJown>  \s&0^  ^  ffld<«pt  the 
evidence  of  revealed  religion.    Unless,  therefore,  conduct 
which  conduces  to  the  pleasantest  possible  life  is  clearly 
forbidden  by  an  authoritative  revelation,  the  hedonist 
insists  that  that  conduct  is  legitimate.    More  than  this, 
a  revelation  which  ran  counter  to  the  laws  of  health  would 
have  to  be  very  clear  and  positive  or  intelligent  men  would 
refuse  to   accept  it.    Such  practices  as  self  mutilation, 
self  torture,  excessive  fasting,  celibacy,  asceticism,  and 
deliberate   poverty   have  gradually    become   discounte- 
nanced by  intelligent  man.    They  belong  to  a  philosophy 
of  pain,  which,  however  strong  a  hold  it  may  once  have 
held  on  the  religious  consciousness  of  mankind,  has  grad- 
ually  fallen   into   disfavor.      The  number  of  men  who 
believe  that  God  takes  delight  in  the  sufferings  of  any  of 
his  creatures  is  rapidly  decreasing  and  the  sooner  they 
have  all  disappeared  the  better  it  will  be  for  the  race. 
The   religion   which   attempts   to  retard  the   wheels   of 
progress  will  certainly  and  deservedly  be  crushed  in  the 
attempt.    But  progress  means  increase  in  intelligence, 
strength,  health,  skill   and   happiness;    increase    in  the 
knowledge  of  the  laws  of  nature  and  of  the  human  con- 
stitution; and  increase  in  skill  in  the  application  of  the 
knowledge  for  the  benefit  of  humanity.    Progress  means 
an  elevation  of  the  ideal  of  human  destiny  and  an  increase 
in  the  effort  to  attain  that  ideal.    Progress  means  the 
discovery  of  the  causes  of  human  misery  and  wretched- 
ness, and  the  removal  of  those  evils,  in  so  far  as  it  lies 
within  human  power  to  remove  them.    Progress  means 
faithfulness  to  truth  and  honesty  about  facts,  though  all 
our  preconceived  notions  and  theories  must  be  setcrificed. 

IV.    THB  DIFFICUI.TIES  OF  HEDONISM. 

A  Plea  for  Hedonism  which  should  neglect  to  examine 
the  many  objections  which  have  been  made  to  the  doctrine 
would  be  a  very  one  sided  argument.  The  attempt  to 
answer  all  the  objections  which  have  been  put  forward  in 
opposition  to  our  theory  would  be  to  write  a  book  as 
large  as  those  of  Thomas  Aquinas  and  Richard  Cumber- 
lajid.    But  a  glance  at  some  of  the  chief  objections  will 


serve  to  strengthen  the  position  of  Hedonism  as  the  real 
guide  to  conduct. 

1.    The  '^Sum  of  Pleasures." 

Among  the  objections  most  frequently  advanced 
against  our  theory  is  that  which  the  late  Professor  T.  H. 
Green  dwelt  most  upon,  to  wit:  that  there  can  be  no  "sum 
of  pleasures''  and  that  therefore  it  is  not  possible  to 
strive  for  **tllfe  greatest  possible  sum  of  pleasures". 

That  pleasure  cannot  be  gathered  like  black-berries 
and  heaped  up  in  baskets,  everyone  will  admit.  But  that 
one  may  enjoy  a  greater  amount  of  pleasure  or  happiness 
than  another,  everyone  knows  to  be  the  case.  In  matters 
of  food,  two  loaves  are  better  than  one;  in  matters  of 
clothing,  two  blankets  are  better  than  one;  in  matters  of 
senses,  two  eyes  are  better  than  one;  two  ears  better  than 
one;  in  matters  of  activity,  two  hands  and  two  feet  are 
better  than  one  hand  and  one  foot.  In  matters  of 
education,  two  years  of  schooling  are  better  than  one, 
two  hundred  volumes  more  serviceable  than  one  hundred; 
in  matters  of  agriculture,  two  horses  are  better  than  one, 
two  cows  better  than  one,  a  two  story  house  better  than 
a  one  story  house.  So  in  matters  of  pure  enjoyment,  a 
two  days  vacation  is  preferable  to  one  day,  two  chickens 
go  farther  at  a  picnic  than  one,  two  pounds  of  candy  than 
one,  two  bottles  of  wine  than  one.  If  those  who  argue 
that  there  can  be  no  summation  of  pleasures  mean  to  say 
that  there  is  no  such  thing  as  varying  the  amount  of 
one's  pleasures,  they  are  talking  against  facts.  If  they 
mean  anything  else  they  do  not  interest  either  the  Hedon- 
ist or  the  practical  man.^* 

2.    The  Ppoblem  of  Responsibility. 

It  is  sometimes  objected  to  the  doctrine  of  Hedonism 
that  it  destroys  human  responsibility.  For  if  each  indi- 
vidual is  his  own  judge  as  to  what  will  promote  his  great- 
est happiness,  other  men  have  no  ground  for  interference, 
even  if  he  is  mistaken.  The  contented  swine  knows  his 
own  mind  better  than  any  one  else  can  know  it,  and  if 


35 


See  Taylor,  J>rob.  of  Conduct,  p.  330^ 


'I  , 


I  i; 


li'^ 


;  i 


46 


A  Plea  for  HedoDiem. 


the  wallow  furnishes  him  the  means  of  the  purest  enjoy- 
ment, creatures  who  do  not  care  for  the  mire  should  not 

interfere. 

There  is  an  element  of  truth  in  this  contention.  We 
must  not  try  to  force  upon  a  nature  interests  which  are 
wholly  alien  to  it.  By  no  possible  contrivance  can  the 
pig  be  made  to  enjoy  the  parlor  as  much  as  he  enjoys  his 
wallow.  And  if  it  wore  necessary  to  take  pig  natures  into 
account  in  the  state  and  in  society,  it  would  be  necessary 
to  make  allowance  for  thia  fact.^*  But  while  human  tem- 
peraments vary  greatly,  they  do  not  vary  so  greatly  as 
do  the  temperament  of  a  man  and  a  pig.  There  are  cer- 
tain general  traits  which  are  found  in  all  men's  natures, 
certain  likes  and  dislikes,  certain  sympathies  and  antip- 
athies. It  is  on  the  basis  of  these  traits  that  society  and 
the  state  are  constructed."  Within  certain  limits  we 
encourage  individuality,  but  certain  bounds  must  not  be 
passed  by  the  individual.  He  must  not  commit  murder, 
arson,  theft,  slander,  assault  and  battery,  adultery  or 
nuisance.  Every  intelligent  man  is  presumed  to  know 
the  evil  consequences  of  such  acts,  in  terms  of  welfare 
(pleasure  and  pain), upon  his  neighbors.  Their  effects  are 
so  uniformly  evil  that  the  state  itself  attends  to  their 
punishment.  There  is  an  implied  agreement  among  all 
moral  citizens  not  to  commit  such  deeds.  Other  acts, 
such  as  drunkenness,  lying  and  rudeness  the  state  does 
not  attempt  to  punish  unless  accompanied  by  acts  of 
interference  with  the  rights  of  others.  The  child  and  the 
lunq,tic  are  excused  from  responsibility  for  the  same 
reason  thg^t  the  dumb  beast  is  excused.  They  lack  the 
intelligence  necessary  to  link  caus«  and  effect.  The  prob- 
lem at  which  criminologists  are  now  working  is  whether 
the  criminal  has  that  degree  of  int;elligence  which  should 
enable  him  to  see  the  results  of  his  act  as  they  are  seen  by 
the  normal  man.'^    But  even  if  a  man  is  lacking  in  intelli- 


A  Plea  for  Hedoniem, 


47 


gence,  the  sanctions  of  law  and  morals  are  sometimes 
binding  upon  him.  If  he  knows  that  an  act  is  forbidden 
under  a  given  penalty,  he  should  be  punished,  even  if  he 
is  not  able  to  reason  out  the  full  consequence  of  his  act.^^ 
For  only  thus  can  society  maintain  its  existence.  Luna- 
tics and  small  children  are  greatly  restrained  by  the 
certainty  of  punishment,  although  they  are  unable  to 
appreciate  the  reason  for  the  establishment  of  punish- 
ment. In  fact,  the  philosophers  themselves  have  not  yet 
come  to  an  agreement  as  to  the  basis  and  grounds  of 
punishment. 

The  limits,  also,  within  which  society  shall  restrain 
the  actions  of  the  individual  are  still  a  matter  of  dispute. 
The  Socialist  would  have  the  state  take  charge  of  almost 
the  whole  human  life,  while  the  individualist  would  limit 
state  control  to  the  enforcement  of  the  criminal   law. 
This  is  not  the  pl^ce  to  follow  up  the  discussion;  suffice  it 
to  say  that  in  our  opinion  the  question  is  purely  one  of 
utility.    If  the  majority  of  the  citizens  within  a  given  area 
prefer  socialism,  it  seems  to  me  that  they  are  justified  in 
adopting  such  a  mode  of  government.    The  individual 
who  dislikes  such  a  course  can  move  away  or  exert  his 
influence  to  reform  the  law.    What  I  have  said  above  does 
not  amount  to  saying  that  might  makes  right.    At  least, 
if  by  right  is  meant  the  greatest  welfare  of  the  individuals 
of  the  society.    For  the  action  of  the  majority  may  really 
prove  injurious  or  even  destructive  to  the  society.    Such 
a  course  makes  only  a  relative  right  or  political  right." 
Conformity  to  the  social  law,  whatever  it  may  be,  entitles 
one  to  the  social  approval  and  the  escape  from  the  sanc- 
tions of  the  social  law.    But  such  conformity  does  not 
ensure  the  actor  his  greatest  happiness  or  welfare.    Nor 
has  any  society  more   than  a  relative  justification   in 
adopting  a  law  which  is  not  for  the  welfare  of  the  society. 
An  independent  people  is  responsible  to  no  other  earthly 


»«Hoffdibg,  Ethik.,  p.  109. 

"See  W.  WaUace,  Lectures  and  Essays,  pp.  250  and  261  et  leq. 
»»Whaston,   Crim.    Law,   I.   cb.   z;   ^JJjeW)'?   PoUock  on  the  Law  of 
Torts,  ch.  2,  p.  23.    See  W*  Wallnce,  op,  cit.  ^^Q,  ..  .    .      • 


'^Sidgwick,  Meth.  of  Eth.,  Bk.  I,  ch.  5;  Maudsley,  Responsibility  in 
Mental  Dfeease. 

^•Hefleiii  Uejp  tjie  faHaoy  oj  IlofeJ^ss,  who  jnade  tjie  political  unction, 
to  {Jojifluct  absolute.     Leviatham,  t/h.  26. 


48 


A  Plea  for  HedoniBm, 


A  Plea,  for  Hedonism, 


49 


III 


power  for  its  acts,  but  that  does  not  make  its  acts  abso- 
lutely right.  Only  correspondence  with  the  greatest  wel- 
fare of  the  society  can  make  a  law  absolutely  right."  As 
A.  E.  Taylor  says,  "When  the  evolution  of  ethical  senti- 
ment is  complete,  I  am  responsible  to  myself  for  obedience 
to  a  law  which  I  impose  on  myself,  for  the  discharge  of 
duties  which  I  expect  of  myself,  and  should  continue  to 
expect,  though  God  and  man  were  to  agree  to  conniye  at 
my  disregard  of  them*'.  In  other  words,  when  I  have 
adopted  my  ethical  ideal,  no  matter  what  it  may  be,  I 
have  become  a  law  unto  myself,  the  judge  of  my  own 
action."*" 

3.    The  Variability  of  Human  Nature. 

Another  objection  which  has  been  often  urged  against 
Hedonism  ii  that  human  nature  is  so  variable  as  to  make 
any  standard  of  action  based  thereon  of  little  if  any  value. 
This  objection  is  not  substantially  different  from  the  last 
preceding.  What  pleases  my  taste  may  be  disgusting  to 
my  neighbor.  What  he  likes  may  be  repulsive  to  me. 
The  tastes  of  youth  vary  from  the  taste  of  old  age.  The 
young  love  activity,  noise,  strife,  opposition.  The  old 
love  quiet,  peace,  unanimity,  concordance.  One  man 
loves  self-assertion,  boldness,  courage,  coolness,  nerve 
and  skill.  Another  prefers  humility,  meekness,  kindness, 
affection  and  grace.  One  man  prefers  wealth  and  pomp, 
praise  and  prominence.  Another  prefers  a  quiet  nook 
with  his  pipe  and  his  book,  or  independence  and  rags  like 
Huckleberry  Finn.  One  man  is  self-contained  and  prefers 
his  own  company  to  that  of  any  one  else.  Another  lives 
in  the  conversation  and  opinions  of  other  men.  One  man 
never  loses  sight  of  his  own  interests;  his  every  act  is  a 
move  to  promote  his  own  welfare.  Another  is  naturally 
sympathetic.    He  seldom  thinks  of  hii  own  welfare,  but  is 


1/ 


"Since  the  above  was  written  I  find  that  Prof.  William  Wallace 
haa  already  expressed  the  same  idea  in  much  better  terms.  See  Essays 
and  Lectures,  pp.  253-4. 

"A.  E.  Taylor,  The  Problem  of  Conduct,  p.  I53' 

*»Kant  no  doubt  had  this  c^liitionaKy  product  in  mind  when  he 
declared  for  the  famous  * 'categorical  imperative. '< 


always  studying  how  he  can  do  more  to  make  his  fellow- 
men  happier.  One  man  spends  all  his  substance  for  the 
good  of  others.  Another  wears  himself  out  devising 
methods  for  getting  possession  of  the  goods  of  others. 
Differences  of  temperament  are  familiar  to  us  all."  How 
will  the  hedonist  reconcile  all  this  variability? 

The  hedonist  will  not  reconcile  it  at  all.  He  takes 
men  as  they  are.  When  he  finds  that  the  benevolent  dis- 
position is  for  the  social  good,  he  will  join  with  nature  in 
encouraging  such  men.  But  the  greater  part  of  the 
problem  nature  must  solve.  She  has  probably  found  use 
for  courage,  anger,  covetousness,  and  pugnacity  in  the 
past,  or  she  would  have  rooted  them  out  of  human 
nature  before  this.*^  ^^This  variability  of  sentiment  is  but 
the  concomitant  of  the  transition  from  the  aboriginal 
type  of  society  fitted  for  destructive  activities,  to  the  civi- 
hzed  type  fitted  for  peaceful  activities.''  '  But  so  long  as 
this  variability  exists,  of  course  the  line  of  conduct  of 
differeatly  constituted  individuals  could  not  be  expected 
agree  in  all  respects. 

The  hedonist  is  not  bound  to  lay  down  any  hard  and 
fast  rules  of  conduct.  He  insists,  on  the  contrary,  on  the 
greatest  freedom  for  all  in  the  formation  and  pursuit  of 
these  ideals.  Certain  general  rules  all  must  observe;  but 
beyond  these,  there  is  a  wide  field  left  open  for  the  Individ- 
ual  choice  and  preference. 

4.    The  Paradox  of  Hedonism. 

One  of  the  most  frequently  mentioned  objections  to 
Hedonism  is  the  so-called  'Taradox  of  Hedonism''.  In 
the  briefly  worded  phrase  of  Prof.  Sidgwick,  '^To  get 
pleasure,  one  must  forget  it."  Sidgwick  and  others  urge 
that  pleasure  cannot  be  the  end  or  aim  of  conduct  from 
the  fact  that  when  we  fix  our  thoughts  too  closely  on 
the  pleasure  which  our  activities  are  to  bring  us,  tne 
result  is  generally  disappointing.  The  pleasure  seeker  is 
by  no  means  the  happiest  of  mortals.    Men  who  fix  their 

HSee  Lotze,  Micrososnfus,  Bk>  VI.,  ch.  2. 
*^ee  Spencer,  Prin.  Psyc,  II,  ^524. 


w 


\  !1 


80 


A  PIm  for  Hedooiem. 


A  Plea  lor  HedoaiBm. 


61 


m 


f'  ,1  / 


Y 


mindB  on  the  attainment  of  other  objects  than  their  own 
pleasures  are  usually  the  most  contented  and  happy. 

Those  who  raise  this  objection  neglect,  it  seems  to  me, 
several  important  psychological  phenomena.    The  first 
of  these  is  the  law  of  attention.    The  human  mind  is  so 
constituted  that  the  field  of  clear  consciousness  is  always 
narrow.    And  owing  to  the  fact  that  human  ideals  must 
be  attained  by  more  or  less  elaborate  means  or  processes, 
it  is  generally  necessary  to  concentrate  tke  attention  so 
closely  on  the  means  and  details,  that  the  ideal  or  ulti- 
mate purpose  of  the  conduct  is  for  the  time  shut  out  from 
the  field  of  consciousness;  just  as  the  top  of  the  hill  is 
shut  off  by  the  windings  of  the  road.    These  facts  are  so 
familiar    that  it  appears  stranger  that  a  psychologist 
with  the  penetration  which   Sidgwick  possessed  should 
overlook  them.    But  while  our  ideal  may  be  forgotten 
while  we  are  devoting  attention  to  the  means,  it  has  not 
really  passed  into  oblivion.    Jacob,  for  instance,  during 
the  seven  years  of  his  service  for  the  hand  of  Rachel  must 
have  found  it  constantly  necessary  to  devote  his  whole 
attention    to  his  work.    But  the  ultimate  reward  was 
before  him  all  the  time.    Had  Rachel  died,  his  course  of 
life  would  have  been  instantly  changed.    Young  Hanni- 
bal, too,  as  he  underwent  the  weary  exercises  necessary 
to  train  him  for  the  hardy  life  of  a  soldier,  must  have 
frequently  forgot  his  oath  to  destroy  Rome,  yet  that 
oath  spurred  him  on  through  all  trials  and  hardships.    So 
the  man  who  devotea  his  life  to  art,  science  or  literature 
must  frequently  lose  liimself  in  the  drudgery  of  essential 
preparation  and  discipline,  yt-t  he  expects  the  attainment 
of  his  ideal  to  bring  a  great  satisfax^tion  and  pleasure. 

Once  more,  those  who  insist  upon  the  paradox  of 
Hedonism,  as  well  as  those  who  hold  that  pleasure  is  not 
the  only  object  of  desire**  forget  the  sources  and  nature  of 
pleasure.  For  our  present  purposes,  it  is  only  necessary 
to  point  out  that  activity  as  such  is  usually  agreeable. 
Compulsory  inactivity  is  the  severest  punishment  to  most 
men.    For  this  reason  the  pursuit  ol  aa  Meal  is  often  as 

•  •     .  *  • 

^fiEspeciaUy  Qrecj*,  Prolog,  to  Ethics,  p.  i86  ct  fleq. 


pleasant  or  even  pleasanter  than  the  attainment  thereof. 
Thus  all  kinds  of  games  afford  amusement,  the  end  to  be 
accomplished  being  quite  subordinate.  Once  more,  the 
mere  contemplation  or  the  accomplishment  of  success  is 
often  a  sufficient  motive  to  justify  much  toil  and  trouble, 
regardless  of  the  importance  of  the  success  itself. 

Some  men  are  willing  to  devote  a  lifetime  of  drudgery 
to  accomplish  an  ideal,  which  other  men  would  regard  as 
trivial.  Others  again  derive  their  enjoyment  from  the 
struggle  in  which  they  engage,  from  the  victories  and 
triumphs  which  they  secure,  regardless  of  the  actual  ulti- 
mate  value  to  themselves  or  others  of  these  achievements. 
Again,  some  men  prefer  the  enjoyment  of  as  much  inactiv- 
ity as  possible.  Such  natures  would  prefer  an  eternity  of 
Nirvana  to  one  of  'Splaying  on  a  golden  harp''  or  other 
activity. 

Lastly,  the  pleasures  of  some  men  are  intellectual, 
those  of  others,  emotional,  and  those  of  others,  sensual. 
The  intellectual  and  sensual  pleasures  relate  more  closely 
to  the  self  than  do  the  emotional.    Many  of  the  emotional 
pleasures  arise  from  altruistic  activities.    Some  men  are 
so  constituted  that  activity  for  the  benefit  of  others  is 
always  more  ^joyable  to  them  than  self-beneficial  activi- 
ties.   For  a  mind  so  constituted,  no  doubt  it  is  true  that^ 
the  best  way  to  get  a  pleasure  is  to  forget  it.    And  in  all 
the  cases  above  mentioned,  it  is  evident  that  the  ideal  is 
either  a  purely  pleasant  or  agreeable  one  or  else  involves 
sufficient  pleasure  or  satisfaction  in  its  attainment  to 
make  it  come  under  the  category  of  Hedonism.     The 
course  of  life  which  one  prefers   to  follow  and    would 
willingly  pursue  a  second  time  is  hedonistic,  whether  the 
goal  of  that  life  or  only  the  struggle  toward  that  goal  is 
the  ground  of  that  satisfaction  and  desirability.     Un- 
trammeled  preferability  is  the  real  hedonistic  test.    Hence 
those,  such     as   Green,*^    who   attempt    to   distinguish 
between  ''pleasure"  and  ' 'self-satisfaction"  are  making  a 
limitation  which  Hedonism  refuses  to  recognize.    Men's 
pretowoM©*  li»  at  the  base  of  their  activities.    Hedonism 

f 

♦^oj).  cit.  p.  187.  :  '  '     .• 


52 


A  Plea  for  Hedonism, 


)\ 


Beeks  to  reaoh  and  guide  through  these  preferences.  In 
some  cases  the  preferences  themselves  need  enlightenment. 
That  is  the  business  of  the  scienes.  In  other  cases  new 
preferences  are  needed.  This  is  never  strictly  the  business 
of  ethics— assisting  nature. 

V.  THE  PROBLEM  OF  ALTRUISM. 

1.    Pseudo  Altruism. 

Our  purpose,  then,  is  to  outline,  if  possible,  a  philos- 
ophy of  conduct;  that  is,  to  show  what  line  of  conduct  is 
most  desirable  or  preferable,  under  the  circumstancs  of  a 
particular  environment.    So  much  of  conduct,  therefore, 
as  can  be  shown  to  be  desirable  to  the  individual  as  an 
individual,  whether  it  is  also  conducive  to  social  welfare 
or  not,  that  is,  whether  it  is  socially  desirable  or  not,  need 
not  concern  us  in  the  present  section.  (Kant  ruled  seK- 
benefitting  acts  out  of  the   province  of  ethics.)    For,  if 
under  every  possible  view  of  the  environment,  present  and 
future,  the  proposed  line  of  conduct  is  desirable  or  prefer- 
able for  the  individual,  we  must  assume  that  the  Individ- 
nal  will  follow  that  line  of  conduct  if  possible,  as  soon  as 
he  becomes  aware  of  this  fact.    The  trouble  in  the  past 
has  been  that  the  individual  took  too  narrow  a  view  of 
the    environment  and  was  unable  to  see  that  conduct 
which  was  socially  desirable  was  also  individually  desir- 
able.   Thus  the  advantage  of  association  in  the  largest 
possible  groups    under   similar  laws   did   not    become 
apparent  to  men  for  thousands  of  years.    But  the  destruc- 
tion of  tribes  who  failed  to  see  the  advantage  of  larger 
unions,  and  the  gradual  development  of  the  more  fortu- 
nate tribes  and  nations  which  combined  their  strength 
has  at  last  developed  the  idea  of  world  empires.    The 
advantages  of  universal  education,  of  faithful  fulfillment 
of  contracts,  of  veracity  and  honesty,  of  chastity  and 
sobriety,   of  politeness,    neighborliness,   considerateness 
and  respectfulness  have  only  gradually  dawned  on  the 
human   mind.    That   a   perfectly  selfish  and   unsympa- 
thetic man  may  contribute  largely  to  the  social  welfare  in 
all  these  and  many  other  w^ys  is  apparent.    Tfeu^  a  wise 
man  might  so  act  among  a  savage  tribfe  as  to  gain  ^e 


,'  1 


A  Plea  for  Hedonism, 


53 


credit     of    being  exceedingly  altruistic,  amd  yet  be  act- 
ing all  the,  time  in  his  own  interest.    This  policy  is  now 
very  commonly  pursued  among  enterprising  morchants 
and  traders,  not  only  among  savages,  but  in  the  midst  of 
the   highest   civilization.      From   what  we    have, 
sad,    it  is   apparent  that  a  vast  amount  of    con- 
duct is  credited   as   altruistic    or    disinterested   which 
is  not  so  in  reality.    It  is  further  apparent  that  much 
activity  is  called  disinterested  which  would  not  be  so  called 
if  we  were  well  enough  informed  to  see  that  the  actor  is 
really  working  for  his  own  benefit,  that  is,  that  in  addi- 
tion to  the  altruistic  results  of  his  actions  they  have  also 
self-beneficial  results  which  amply  justify  them.    In  many 
cases,  too,  the  actor  looks  on  these  self-beneficial  results 
as  a  sort  of  reward  for  the  altruistic  consequences  of  his 
acts,  and  is  thus  further  supported  in  his  action  by  the 
consciousness  of  a  supposed  merit,  a  merit  which  would 
disappear  could  all  men  clearly  perceive  the  self-beneficial 
consequences  of  the  acts.    For  we  do  not  ascribe  merit  to 
acts  whose  beneficial  consequences  to  the  actor  are  clearly 
and  certainly  foreseen.    But  these  concepts  of  equity  and 
justice,  which  lead  us  daily  to  a  thousand  acts  without  a 
thought  o  f their  having  any  moral  quality  whatsoever  are 
the   product  of  age— any  training  of  the  race  in  social 
experiences.    By  means  of  the  canon  of  consequences,  we 
have  become  so  thoroughly  drilled  in  the  more  common 
matters  of  social  intercourse,  that  it   is  only   with   an 
effort  that  we  can  perceive  their  moral  quality.    Hence 
the  line  between  pseudo-altruism  and  prudence  is  gradually 
being  pushed  back,  as  men  perceive  the  prudential  advan- 
tage of  a  given  course  of  action—that  it  is  clearly  to  the 
advantage  of  the  actor  to  follow  it,  one  ceases  to  attrib- 
ute merit  to  the  act.    As  we  show  in  the  next  section, 
there  is  reason  to  believe,  and  it  is  the  object  of  Hedonism' 
to  point  out  to  all  men,  that  the  field  of  prudence  will  in 
time  cover  the  entire  field  of  human  voluntary  activities. 
2.    Bational  Altruism. 

There  is  another  important  group  of  activities  which 
are  commonly  classed  as  disinterested,  which  on  closer 


'H 


54 


A  Plea  tor  Hedonism. 


A  Pha  for  BedoaiBm. 


SB 


examination  turn  out  to  be  only  a  fi^btter  f^raa  of 
interested  activities.  Take  the  familiar  ^om  of  a  Haan 
who  enters  an  army.  If  uninstructed,  the  nnlfural  hnpulse 
would  be  to  run  when  danger  appears.  But  the  wise 
general  will  explain  to  his  soldiers  that  a  bold  front  often 
frightens  the  enen^y  away,  that  even  where  this  does  not 
happen,  that  by  standing  firmly  together  each  individual 
is  really  much  safer  than  if  he  attempts  to  retreat. 
Following  such  in -truction  the  soldier  learns  to  face  the 
danger  and  stand  by  his  comrades  when  they  are  in 
danger.  The  importance  of  keeping  watch  is  appreciated 
by  all,  and  therefore  when  the  turn  of  any  individual 
comes  to  stand  sei,  fcinel,  he  takes  the  chances  of  being  shot 
for  the  sake  of  pre  serving  himself  and  others,  and  also  for 
the  sake  of  having  others  stand  sentinel  when  their  turn 

comes. 

Take  now  a  more  intricate  case.  We  feave  Indicated 
above  that  the  wise  man  learns  the  value  in  the  long  run 
of  veracity,  honesty,  chastity,  kindness,  politeness  and 
the  many  other  social  virtues.  But  he  also  finds  that 
these  virtues  can  only  be  acquired  by  eonstant  exercise. 
This  constant  exercise  forms  a  habit.  Now,  when  a  case 
comes  where  a  lie  would  possibly  be  advantageous,  the 
habit  of  veracity  has  become  so  strong  that  the  truth 
comes  out,  even  while  the  speaker  realizes  that  it  may 
cost  his  fortune  or  his  life.  A  thoughtful  man  may  have 
reflected  on  the  possibility  of  such  an  occurrence  early  in 
life.  But  it  was  only  a  possibility  and  the  chances  in 
favor  of  its  not  occurring,  or  the  net  gain  of  truth  telling 
may  have  been  such  as  to  lead  him  consciously  to  take 
the  chances,  or  to  take  the  smaller  evil  with  the  greater 
good.  Where  the  whole  course  of  conduct  is  profitable, 
then  the  particular  instance  where  the  course  proves  dis- 
advantageous should  not  be  classed  as  disinterested, 
especially  where  it  was  necessary  to  form  a  habit  of  acting 
in  the  given  way  in  order  to  attain  the  best  results.  But 
experience  teaches  that  all  the  common  virtues,  which  on 
the  whole  are  recognized  by  intelligent  people  as  profit- 
able to  the  actor,  but  which  in  particular  instances  could 
be  departed  from  with  advantage  by  the  actor,  can  attain 


their  fullest  us^akoess  only  by  coastant  aad  unremi^pted 
practice  all  thjumgh  life,  thereby  making  them  alB^st 
mechanical   by   habitual   praellce.    Thus   the  habiti    of 
veracity  may  become  so  fixed  as  to  make  death  easier 
than  falsehood.    While  frequent  departure  from  the  truth 
makes  lying  so  easy  as  to  give  no  sting  of  conscience 
whatever.    The  same  is  true  as  to  faithfulness  to  promises. 
To  a  man  like  Regains,  death  by  torment  is  preferable  to 
breach  of  promise.    A  man  who  has  not  trained  himself 
to  this  habitual  fidelity  to  promises  would  feel  amply 
justified  in   breaking   a   promise  extorted   as   was   the 
promise  of  Regulus.    The  same  rule  holds  good  as  to  pro- 
fanity, to  abstinence  from  intoxicants  and  sexual  indul- 
gence, and  to  honesty.^8    Self-culture,  which  is  the  aim  of 
self-discipline,  i^  the  eontradietory  of  social  justice,  which 
is  the  aim  of  true  altruism.    This  self-cultivating  activity 
I   have  called  rational  altruism.      When   two  habitual 
virtues  come  into  confiict,  we  have  a  curious  altruistic 
puzzle,  such  as  the  problem  of  veracity  when  in  conflict 
with  the  habit  or  impulse   of  kindness.    Shall  I  lie  to 
prevent  the  wrongful  death  or  injury  of  a  friend?    This 
question  has  puzzled  philosophers  from  the  days  of  Aris- 
totle, to  those  of  James  Martineau.    Rational  altruism 
would  apparently  solve  the  problem  in  favor  of  veracity; 
but  pure  altruism,  submitting  to  the  power  of  the  altru- 
istic sentiment,  will  probably  always  solve  it  in  favor  of 
kindness. 

The  foregoing  remarks  are  intended  to  show  the 
reader  how  narrow  the  margin  of  conflict  is  between 
activity  which  is  socially  beneficial  and  that 
which  is  beneficial  for  the  individual  but  injurious 
to  society.  The  narrower  this  margin  can  be  made  to 
appear,  the  easier  it  will  be  to  persuade  men  to  live 
morally.  For  so  long  as  you  can  point  out  to  a  man 
that  the  line  of  conduct  which  you  suggest  is  really  prefer- 
able  for  him,  is  in  fact  that  which  he  would  follow  if  he 
knew  his  own  interest,  you  may  expect  that  he  will  listen 

*»Taylor  brings  the  above  distinction  out  very  clearly  in  Chap    V   of 
his  Problem  of  Kthks. 


.if:" 
til. 


1 

1 

H ' 

*    ,  '     , 

1 

f^' 

ifi 

f      ( 

1 

|(;;^ 

M 

i>k 

* 


1  »' 


5tf 


<4  P/ea  ior  Hedonism. 


to  you.  But  if  you  appeal  to  a  man's  conscience,  to  his 
sense  of  duty,  to  the  social  welfare,  or  the  happiness  of 
posterity,  you  may  feel  sure  that  he  will  listen  to  you 
unwillingly.  No  one  can  calculate  the  amount  of  misery 
which  exists  because  men  are  either  following  unwillingly 
a  course  of  actio  a  which  they  feel  in  duty  bound  to 
follow,  but  would  ])refer  not  to  follow,  or  are  living  for  self, 
while  feeling  that  t  hey  ought  to  be  doing  something  else. 
An  ethical  theory,  therefore,  which  can  convince  men,  even 
in  a  small  degree  t  hat  what  they  think  duty  is  really  self- 
interest,  and  what  they  think  self-interest  is  really  often 
injurious  will  conf*  r  a  great  boon  on  mankind.  There  is 
misery  and  wretch  t^dness  in  life  at  best,  without  any  more 
of  it  based  on  unnc^cesiary  grounds. 

8.    Pure  Altruism. 

But  after  all  has  been  said  that  it  is  possible  to  say  in 
the  way  of  na^ro\^  ing  the  margin  of  conflict  between  self- 
interest  and  altruism,  we  must  acknowledge  that  there  is 
still  a  margin  left.  The  welfare  of  the  individual,  at  the 
present  day,  does  not  quite  correspond,  so  far  as  we  can 
see,  with  the  welfare  of  humanity.  More  than  this, 
individuals  are  found  who  are  consciously  acting  in  she 
interest  of  society  to  the  detriment  of  their  own  interests. 
Real  self-sacriflce  is  a  fact  so  familiar  that  we  cannot 
shut  our  eyes  to  it.  Heroism  is  a  word  to  be  found  in 
most  languages,  and  heroes  are  to  found  in  all  ages  and 
among  all  peoples.  Maternal  love,  social  sympathy  and 
pity  are  too  well  known  to  be  denied.  Moreover,  the 
efforts  of  Bentham,  James  Mill  and  others  to  reduce 
altruism  to  terms  of  self-interest  were  not  successful.*^ 
No  doubt  they  had  in  mind  the  instances  we  have  given 
above  of  pseudo-altruism  and  rational  altruism.  But  we 
must  admit  many  cases  of  true  self-sacrifice,  conscious, 
deliberate  self-sacrifice.  How  shall  we  a^jcount  for  these 
cases?  That  self-saxjrifice  is  not  logically  justifiable  on 
hedonistic  principles  we  must  continue  to  assert.  But  if 
it  is  not  logically  justifiable,  how  can  it  be  amounted  for? 

*»Stq^ben,  the  Kng.  Util.,  I.  p.  313  et  teq;  II.  321. 


A  Pka  for  Hedonism. 


57 


Leslie  Stephen,  Herbert  Spencer  and  S.  Alexander, 
three  of  the  leading  evolutionary  hedonists,  answer  the 
question  by  pointing  out  that  our  activity  is  determined 
by  the  ideas  and  emotions  present  at  the  moment  of 
decision.  Now  the  present  idea  of  a  future  pleasure  or 
pain  may  be  very  different  from  the  actual  pleasure  or 
pain,  when  it  arrives.  While  the  idea  of  the  suffering 
which  another  will  endure,  together  with  our  own  after 
recollections  of  the  same,  may  present  a  very  vivid  motive 
to  perform  the  act.  Thus  our  own  good  is  the  motive 
after  all.  As  Spencer  points  out,  the  pains  of  another 
may  be  as  clear  to  us  as  our  own  future  pains.  Our  sym- 
pathies are  strongest  where  we  have  ourselves  experienced 
the  sufferings  which  we  now  see  in  another.  And  with 
sufferings  which  we  have  never  experienced  our  sym- 
pathies are  correspondmgly  weak.  The  actual  pain  or 
pleasure  of  another  is  not,  therefore,  our  motive  in  altru- 
istic activity,  but  the  ideas  of  those  pains  and  pleasures 
which  exist  in  our  own  minds. 

There  is  no  doubt  considerable  force  in  this  line  of 
reasoning.  Yet  A.  E.  Taylor,  in  his  Problem  of  Conduct, 
denies  that  it  has  any  validity;  taking  the  ground  that 
we  have  no  present  idea  of  future  pleasures  and  pains  at 
all.  But  this  view  is  certainly  erroneous.  I  have  said 
above  that  from  the  standpoint  of  Hedonism  altruistic 
conduct  is  illogical.  But  because  it  is  illogical,  it  by  no 
means  follows  that  it  cannot  be  accounted  for.  There  are 
other  impulses  of  the  same  kind.  Superstitious  feelings 
are  also  illogical,  but  one  cannot  for  that  reason  free  him- 
self from  them.  The  child  shrieks  with  terror  when  his 
little  brother  plays  bear,  knowing  all  the  while  that  there 
is  no  real  danger.  Adults  will  do  the  same  at  the  sight  of 
an  artificial  snake,  or  even  a  jaek-in-the-box.  Many 
people  do  not  like  to  start  on  a  journey  on  Friday,  or  to 
sit  at  a  table  with  twelve  others,  or  to  break  a  looking- 
glass,  or  to  give  or  receive  an  edged  present.  They  laugh 
at  their  own  feelings,  but  cannot  shake  them  off.  Some 
people  dare  not  stand  near  a  precipice  because  the 
impulse  to  leap  over  is  too  strong  to  be  resisted.    Some 


i      ' 


"■■■:  * 


m 


mil 


11 

1! 


66 


A  Plea  for  Hedookfin, 


A  Plea  lor  Hedonism, 


59 


n 


i 


children  cannot  resist  the*  impiise  to  handle  or  orush 
certain  objects,  knowing  full  well  that  thej  are  obswved 
and  will  be  punished.  A  man  will  often  find  it  Imposefble 
to  resist  the  impulse  to  swear,  or  to  tell  some  one  what  he 
thinks  of  him,  even  while  he  knows  that  the  penalty  will 
be  heavy.  Again,  the  impulse  to  laugh  often  comes  on  us 
at  the  most  inopportune  moments.  We  would  give  our 
right  hand  to  hold  it  back,  but  on  it  comes.  The  impulse 
to  take  revenge  or  to  wreak  spite  is  likewise  often  irresis- 
tible in  the  face  of  penalties.  The  impulse  to  play  tricks 
is  another  instance.  Everyone  will  recall  children  and 
even  adults  who  could  not  resist  the  opportunity  to  play 
a  practical  joke,  even  though  regretting  the  consequences 
at  the  very  moment  of  acting.  Now  all  these  are  really 
cases  of  disinterested,  although  not  altruistic,  activity. 
It  is  irresistible.  Nature  has  implanted  certain  impulses 
in  us  which  all  our  reason  is  not  strong  enough  to  over- 
come. Many  of  our  impulses  can  in  time  be  brought 
under  control.  When  we  perceive  their  evil  consequences, 
we  make  a  constant  effort  to  rid  ourselves  of  them.  But 
in  the  case  of  altruistic  impulses,  the  advantage  to 
society  leads  men  to  approve  the  acts  inspired  by  them, 
and  thus  they  tend  rather  to  become  confirmed,  because 
the  approval  tends  to  make  them  self-interested  acts. 
Besides,  as  I  have  indicated  above,  nature  selects  for  sur- 
vival the  individuals  who  are  strongly  gifted  with  altru- 
istic impulses.*^®  Thus  these  impulses  tend  to  become 
stronger  from  generation  to  generation.  But  the  indi- 
viduals who  have  the  most  vivid  imaginations  and  can 
picture  the  pains  and  pleasures  of  others  most  readily 
will  be  those  who  will  have  the  strongest  sympathies.  So 
nature  will  continue  to  select  those  individuals  who  find 
the  most  pleafiure  in  promoting  the  pleasures  of  others, 
and  who  will  do  the  most  to  lessen  the  pains  of  others. 
The  activities  inspired  by  these  impulses  are  not  then, 
strictly  speaking,  a  part  of  voluntary  conduct  at  all. 


«>Duhring,  Der  Wert  des  I^bens,  cited  by  Hofifding,  Hlit.  Mod. 
Philos.,  II.,  p.  560. 


They  belong  to  the  class  of  activities  which  nature  takes 
care  of— the  instincts  and  reflex  actions." 

As  I  have  already  indicated,  Mr.  Benjamin  Kidd,  &i 
his  Social  Evolution  and  his  Western  Civilization,  has 
emphasized  more  strongly  than  any  other  writer  the  share 
which  nature  takes  in  human  evolution,  by  means  of  the 
evolution  of  the  ethical  and  religious  impulses.    He  brings 
a  large  array  of  facts  to  show  that  not  intellectual  devel- 
opment but  moral  and  religious  development  have  been  the 
characteristics  of  the  races  which  have  won  in  the  struggle 
for  existence.    The  chief  reason  for  this  is  that  intellectual 
families  die  out.    They  are  anxious  to  have  their  child- 
ren occupy  as  high  a  grade  in  society  as  they  themselves 
occupy,  and  this  desire  retards  marriage.      Thus  only 
five  out  of  the  five  hundred  noble  families  in  England  can 
trace  back  their  ancestry  in  the  male  line  to  the  fifteenth 
century.    The  same  is  true  in  France  and  probably  in  all 
other  countries.    The  aristocracy  is  constantly  dying  out 
and  being  replaced  by  a  new  aristocracy.^'    Mere  intellec- 
tual development,  however  high,  is  not  sufficient  to  secure 
the  persistence  of  the  race.    It  is  generally  conceded,  for 
instance,  that  the  Greeks  were  the  most  highly  developed 
intellectually  of  any  people  who  ever  lived.     Yet  while 
they   are  still    in  existence,  nominally,  they  were  long 
ago  outstripped  in  the  race  for  existence,  and  there  is 
probably  very  little  if  any  of  the  blood  of  the  ancient 
Atheneans  now  flowing  in  the  veins  of  the  Grecians.    The 
old   stock   has   entirely   disappeared.    They   lack  those 
traits  of  character  which  insure  posterity  or  racial  persis- 
tence.   The  same  thing  happened  among  the  Romans. 
In  the  days  of  the  empire  the  old  families  disappeared  and 
were  replaced  by  foreigners.    Spain,  France  and  England 
have  had  a  similar  experience.    Nature,  then,  is  constantly 
selecting  for  race  preservation    those  individuals  who 
have  the  social  sentiments,  love  of  offspring,  devotion  to 
family  life,  loyalty  to  clan,  tribe,  or  city,  pity  for  the  weak 
and  mit  freude  with  the  strong,  most  strongly  developed. 

"See  Calkins,  Introd.  to  Psyc,  p.  333,  et  seq. 
"See  especially  Soc.  Evol.  Chap.  IX. 


>  I 


^>   ■'. 


^0 


A  Pfeft  for  Hedoniem, 


A  Plea  for  Hedonism, 


61 


mm 


■  I 


I'     ^    . 


The  variation  of  Boxxlal  sentiment  may  be  very  slight,  is  in 
fact  slight;  but  natore  never  overlooks  these  slight  varia- 
tions. They  may  also  be  what  we  call  accidental.  (And 
that  may  mean  mere  blind  chance,  or  the  work  of  an 
unseen  artificer  working  out  a  great  design. )  But  so  long 
as  they  are  hereditary  they  answer  the  purpose  of  nature. 
Neither  is  it  necessary  that  they  be  intellectually  justifiable. 
To  sacrifice  self  for  others  may  seem  unreasonable,  but  if 
nature  impels  us  to  do  it,  we  must  submit  just  as  we 
submit  to  the  trouble  of  finding  food  and  drink  when  we 
are  hungry  or  thirsty. 

But  it  will  be  objected  that  this  view  fails  to  account 
for  the  high  esteem  which  is  universally  accorded  to  self- 
sacrifice.    Let  us  see.    In  the  first  place,  it  is  natural  for 
the  recipient  to  approve  the  beneficial  act.    This  approval 
is  not  based  on  the  personality  of  the  act,  that  is,  on  the 
fact  that  it  was  voluntarily  and  consciously  performed 
by  an  intelligent  being.    For  we  approve  the  beneficial 
acts  of  nature.    When  the  stone  we  throw  brings  down 
the  fruit  or  the  game,  when  the  seed  we  plant  grows,  and 
when    the  experiment  we   try   succeeds,    we  have    this 
feeling  of  approval.    In  the  next  place,  experience  teaches 
us    that    the    man    who    is   capable  of  self-sacrifice    is 
a  desirable  companion.    The  sacrificial  act  is  an  index  to 
the  character  fit  for  society.    It  indicates  the  presence  of 
of  a  "good*'  man,  one  who  will  not  break  promisee,  lie, 
steal  nor  in  other  ways  prove  himself  unsocial.    It  indi- 
cates  what  we  call   a   "good-natured"   man.     But   we 
approve  and  love  good-natured  animals  as  well  as  good- 
natured  men.    Animals  which  are  affectionate,  tameable, 
not  given  to  treachery  nor  to  fits  of  anger,  which  are 
obedient  and  tractable,   which  are  playful  and  good- 
humored  are  taken  up  as  companions  by  men  and  loved. 
And  who  will   undertake   to    draw  a  line   between   the 
altruistic  activity  of  a  brute  and  that  of  a  man?    The 
maternal  instinct  is  as  strong,  if  not  stronger,  in  the 
former  as  in  the  latter;  the  gregarious  or  social  instinct  is 
as  strong  if  not  stronger,  for  man  is  by  no  means  so 
gregarious  as  the  herbivorous  animals  and  certain  birds. 
Nor  is  the  social  instinct  equally  developed  in  all  men. 


Even  those  who  live  in  large  cities  often  confine  their 
lives  largely  to  the  family.  And  many  men  prefer  the 
seclusion  of  family  life  on  a  farm,  far  from  the  crowd. 
Some  even  prefer  solitary  life.  The  instincts  of  pity  and 
generosity  are  perhaps  more  prominent  in  men  than  in 
brutes  because  men  can  perceive  the  consequences  of 
actions  more  clearly.  And  yet  the  instinct  of  pity,  or 
fjftVction  for  the  weak  is  certainly  highly  developed  in 
many  brutes. 

Again,  we  must  remember  that  altruistic  individuals 
oiten  cannot  realize  their  own  merits.    The  true  hero  can 
not  understand  the  admiration  of  others.    To  the  affec- 
tionate mother  it  seems  only  natural  for  mothers  to  love 
and  care  for  their  offspring.    Her  disapproval  of  unsym- 
pathetic parents  arises  from  a  feeling  that  they  are  lack- 
ing in  "natural''  traits.    There  is  an  instinctive  dislike  for 
defective  or  deformed  people.    (Hence  we  call  an  unsym- 
rathetic  parent  "unnatural.")    And  the  sympathetic  feel 
that  the  unsympathetic  are   defective.    But  to  the  sym- 
pathetic mother  there  is  no  feeling  of  special  approval  of 
other  affectionate  mothers;  such  conduct  seems  "natur- 
al.""   The  same  is  true  in  even  a  greater  degree  with  the 
true  hero.    He  does  not  feel  that  he  has  done  anything 
extraordinary.^*    He  has  simply   done  what  his  nature 
called  him  to  do.    There  is  no  sense  of  effort  or  strain, 
because  there  is  in  fact  no  unnatural  strain.    The  hero  is 
humble^  because  he  is  not  conscious  of  having  done  any^ 
thing  to  be  proud  of.    The  proud  hero  (and  they  are 
numerous  enough)  is  one  who  perceives  the  advantage  of 
heroism.    He  knows  that  people  admire  strength,  beauty, 
skill,  endurance,  energy  and  success,  and  having  one  or 
more  of  these  traits  he  admires  himself  and  enjoys  by 
anticipation  the  pleasures  of  admiration  and  praise.    He 
knows  that  people  admire  and  approve  self-discipline  as 
well  as  self-sacrifice,  and  he  is  willing  to  pay  the  price  for 
1  he  popular  admiration  and  approval.    This  admiration 
and  approval  of   power,  whether  in  form   of  strength, 


««atepjtjw,  Sdeiuae  of  Bthie&  p.  :^5^  ^ng,  UtiJL,  %,  p.  259. 
^ Jacob  A.  Riis,  The  Making' of  an  American^  p.  .^23. 


:|i!H 


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i    ' 

i 

P: 

1 

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Lj'j' 

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am 

(j,  .t  >. 

62 


A  Plea  for  Eeaonism. 


beauty,  Bkill,  eloquence,  endurance,  energy,  cunning:,  or 
of  training  and  self-discipline,  is  partly  hereditary  and 
partly  institutional."  The  advantages  of  power,  both 
for  the  individual  and  for  the  race,  is  so  apparent  that  we 
should  expect  it  to  be  approved  and  encouraged.  Train- 
ing and  self-discipline  are  especially  valuable  both  for  the 
individual  and  for  the  race.  And  the  step  from  self-dis- 
cipline to  altruistic  self-sacrifice  is  so  short  that  it  is 
taken  unconsciously.  In  our  admiration  for  the  trained 
man,  we  usually  fail  to  distinguish  between  the  two.  And 
even  the  philosopher  finds  it  hard  to  draw  the  line.*^® 

4.    Abnormal  Altruism. 

That  the  altruistic  impulses  are  of  natural  origin  is 
further  shown  by  the  fact  that,  like  selfish  impulses,  they 
are  liable  to  be  abnormally  and  hence  injuriously  developed . 
The  mother  may  be  so  affectionate  as  to  **spoir'her  child, 
or  break  down  her  own  health."  The  generous  man  may 
give  away  all  his  property,  thereby  injuring  himself  and, 
what  is  of  more  importance,  those  who  are  dependent  on 
him  for  a  living,  especially  his  immediate  family.  The 
patriot  usually  neglects  those  who  are  immediately  depend- 
ent on  him.*^^  The  reformer  is  apt  to  do  the  same.  The  man 
who  is  gifted  with  too  much  pity  cannot  be  just.  Rogues 
and  rascals  constantly  impose  on  his  good-nature.  This 
is  why  it  is  said  that  women  would  not  make  good  judges 
or  jury-men.  They  could  not  render  a  fair  decision  or 
verdict.  (I  do  not  make  this  assertion  myself,  but  quote 
the  common  opinion.)  The  hero  is  not  so  cautious  as  the 
selfish  man,  and  is  more  apt  to  lose  his  life.  Bravery 
often  becomes  reckless  daring,  if  not  foolhardiness.  The 
over-sympathetic  man  finds  it  hard  to  tell  the  truth  when 
the  truth  will  hurt  a  friend,  hard  to  be  honest  when  dis- 


«*Comp.  Ladd,  Phil,  of  Conduct,  Chap.  XI,  p.  231. 

*«See,  for  instance,  Bradley,  Appearance  and  Reality,  chapter  on 
•'Goodness." 

"See  Spencer,  Ethics,  I,  ^72. 

*"Tel  soulage  le  miserable,  qui  neglige  sa  famille  et  laisse  son  fils 
dfensVindigence."— La  Bruyere,  Characteres,  Qh.  XII,  p.  375-  (Ed. 
1890.)  ' 


A  Pha  tor  Hedomsm, 


68 


honesty  will  help  a  neighbor  at  the  expense  of  a  stranger. 
The  Japanese  are  said  to  be  so  polite  that  they  will  com- 
mit almost  any  crime  rather  than  hurt  the  feelings  of 
other  people. 

Thus  altruism  presents  a  problem  within  a  problem. 
Tniits  of  character  which  were  intended  to  preserve  the 
mew,  tend  when  excessive  to  destroy  the  social  order,  and 
1  hereby  the  race  itself.    But  as  all  altruistic  activity  is 
ill(  gical,  how  shall  excessive  altruism  be  curbed?    We  can 
wijt  reason   with   the   altruistic   person.    He  is   acting 
nocordiug  to  his  nature.    All  that  is  left  to  do  is  to  dis- 
approve  such  conduct  so  strongly  that  in  time  this  disap- 
proval will  act  on  his  feelings.    Nature  herself  will  also 
tend  to  weed  out  the  excessively  altruistic.    It  is  this 
excessive  altruism  which  Nietzsche  and  his  followers  object 
to.®^    Nietzsche  would  apparently  have  us  select  and  breed 
men  as  we  select  and  breed  horses,  cattle  and  sheep.    But 
assuming  the  possibility  of  doing  so,  we  must  still  deter- 
mine the  ideal  character  for  man;  and  the  question  then 
arises  whether  the  emotional  or  sympathetic  character  is 
not  the  ideal,  and  if  so,  how  it  may  best  be  secured? 
They  argue  that  our  sympathy  interferes  with  race  evo- 
lution, and  their  argument  is  apparently  just.    Too  much 
sympathy,  pity  and  generosity  tend  to  make  the  idle  and 
shiftless   more  so.    But  Nietzsche  goes  too   far  in   his 
demands.    Even  among  animals,  where  the  struggle  for 
existence  has  full  play,  it  is  not  the  strongest  and  most 
cunning  individuals  that  survive,  but  the  most  sympa- 
thettc.    Any  attempt,  therefore,  to  lend  a  hand  in  the 
struggle  for  existence  by  helping  the  strong  to  survive 
against  the  weak  would   probably  result  either  in  the 
destmiction  of  the  whole  race,  or  the  nation  that  tried  the 
experiment. 

5.    Moral  Education. 

e 

It  is  well  known  that  to  a  certain  extent  we  can 
educate  or  repress  either  the  selfish  or  the  altruistic 
impolfles  in  ouijpelvee  or  Qth^?^^    Shall  we  educate  the 

*»The  Twilight  of  the  Gods.  * 


u, 


III 


^m 


t 


ill;  I  . 


k 


64 


A  Plea,  lor  Hedonism. 


ielfieh  and  repress  the  altruistic  emotions  or  the  reverse? 
Here  again  it  seems  to  me  that  we  must  resort  to  the 
canon  of  consequences.      We  have  pointed  out  above 
that  the  most  altruistic  impulses  are  at  the  same  time 
beneficial  to  self.    I  believe  that  science  will  show  in  time 
that  those  pseudo-altruistic    impulses   are   inextricably 
united  with  the  altruistic  impulses  which  are  beneficial  to 
the  race  but  prejudicial  to  the  individual,  when  considered 
by  themselves.    If  this  is  the  case,  no  one  will  want  to  rid 
himself  of  those  socially  beneficial  impulses.    Thus  if  my 
neighbor's  vine  has  overgrown  my  fruit  tree,  I  will  not  tear 
down  the  vine  to  preserve  my  fruit  if  by  tearing  it  down 
I  shall  at  the  same  time  kill  my  tree.    So  in  a  case  where 
the  individual   interests   clearly   conflict    with  those  of 
society    and    the    individual    lacks    the     sympathetic 
impulses  necessary  to   pake  him  strive   for   the  social 
interest  rather  than  his  own,  he  must  still  inquire  whether 
he  should  not  seek  to  cultivate  the  lacking  impulses  for 
the  sake  of  other  impulses  which  will  accompany  them. 
As  we  pointed  out  above  the  altruistic  impulses  which  are 
beneficial  to  self  can  only  be  acquired  by  a  self-discipline 
that  will  make  them  practically  mechanical,  and  when 
they  have  become  so  habitual  as  to  be  reflex,  or  mechan- 
ical, they  will  act  in  cases  which  will  be  injurious  to  self  as 
well   as   in  cases  which  are  beneficial  to  self.    In  other 
words,  the  character  which  wisdom  requires  in  order  to 
secure  the  greatest  possible  happiness  to  the  individual  in 
his  environment  on  earth  is  an  organic  unit  of  an  altru- 
istic nature.    He  who  seeks  to  reach  the  highest  possible 
earthly  happiness  by  the  strictly  selfish  road  will  not 
succeed.    The  so-called  paradox  of  Hedonism  is  one  of  the 
deepest  and  most  wonderful  laws  of  human  nature.    One 
must  build  up  an  altruistic  character  to    attain   such 
peace  on  earth  as  is  given  to  men  to  enjoy.    As  Maeter- 
link  so   beautifully  points   out,««    'Tlie  true  sage  must 
suffer.    He  suffers,  and  suffering  forms  a  constituent  part 
oi  his  wisdom.    He  will  suffer,  perhaps,  more  than  most 
men,  for  his  nature  is  far  more  complete.    And    being 


fiowisdom  and  Destiny,  Sec.  39. 


A  Pku  tor  Hedonism. 


65 


nearer  to  all  mankind,  as  the  wise  must  ever  be,  his  suffer- 
ings will  be  the  greater,  for  the  sorrows  of  others  are  his.'* 
And  yet  the  true  sage  enjoys  a  peace  that  passeth  under- 
standing. At  the  end  of  life  he  can  say  with  Paul: 
"I  have  fought  a  good  fight."  His  cup  of  sorrow  may  be 
fuller,  but  he  will  drink  it  willingly.  The  path  of  wisdom 
is  so  sweet  and  peaceful,  that  no  one  would  exchange  it 
for  all  the  paths  of  temporal  pleasure.  Thus  the 
apparent  conflict  between  self-culture  and  social  justice  is 
resolved  into  a  higher  unity,  just  as  all  the  apparent 
conflicts  in  the  universe  resolve  themselves  into  higher 
unities  when  our  knowledge  has  widened  sufficiently  to 
perceive  the  broader  laws.  The  world  is  full  of  conflicts 
and  contradictions  for  the  ignorant,  but  as  knowledge 
widens,  the  conflicts  disappear  one  by  one,  until  at  last 
we  grasp  the  conception  of  the  unity  of  nature. 

Thus  pure  disinterested  altruism  is  an  ineradicable 
accompaniment  of  self-interested  altruism,  and  hence  of 
Hedonism  itself.  Not  only  so,  but  experience  proves  that 
purest  hedonistic  results  may  be  best  attained  by  direct- 
ing the  thought  to  the  social  or  unselfish  aspect  of 
conduct  than  by  the  reverse  process.  Yet  so  long  as  one 
clearly  realizes  from  the  start  that  his  own  greatest 
happiness  will  follow  the  former  course,  he  is  a  consistent 
hedonist.  And  with  that  knowledge  constantly  before 
him,  he  will  not  be  apt  to  fall  into  the  excesses  of  an 
abnormal  altruism.  Justice  to  self  will  regulate  justice  to 
others.  The  ideal  of  self-culture  will  serve  as  a  model  for 
social  culture. 

VI.     CONCLUSION. 

A  few  words  will  suflSce  by  way  of  conclusion.  Glan- 
cing back  over  the  line  of  our  argument  it  will  be  seen  that 
we  tried  to  show  first  that  "Man's  Place  in  Nature"  has 
been  determined  by  the  general  course  of  universal  evolu- 
tion and  is  largely  independent  of  his  own  desires  and 
wishes.  We  might  have  gone  further  and  shown  that  so 
far  as  "Man's  Place  in  Nature"  is  concerned,  the  problem 
of  conduct  is  only  a  temporal  problem.  The  evidence 
points  very  clearly  to  the  recent  origin  of  the  human  race 


66 


A  Plea  for  Ilodoimm, 


A  Ploii  ior  Hedonhsm, 


67 


^.i 


m 


on  earth;  and  it  points  almost  as  clearly  to  the  rather 
early  termination  of  man's  earthly  existence,  speaking  in 
terms  of  the  infinite  ages  of  eternity.  In  view  of  these 
facts,  we  recognized  the  importance  for  the  problem  of 
conduct  of  any  light  which  either  science,  theology  or  re- 
velation  can  throw  on  the  problem  of  man's  nature  and 

ultimate  destiny. 

For  the  philosopher,  the  problem  of  earthly  existence 
can  never  seem  supremely  important,  unless  that  exist- 
ence is  in  some  way  related  to  an  after  life.    If  the  earthly 
life  be  all,  the  ethical  problem   at  times  seems  hardly 
worth  the  solving.    And  yet  while  this  is  true,  there  is  no 
ground  for  despising  the  earthly  life.    Moral  science  is 
still  at  least  as  important  as  any  of  the  other  sciences. 
As  a  sentient  creature,  man  may  as  well  make  the  most 
of  the  earthly  life  which  science  and  revelation  will  permit. 
The  strength  of  Hedonism  lies  in  its  insistance  on   the 
worth  and  dignity  of  the  earthly  life,  even  while  we  are 
still  in  uncertainty  as  to  the  after-life.    It  would  be  idle 
here  to  attempt  to  force  conclusions  upon  the  reader. 
The  most  learned  men  have  differed  in  opinion  as  to  the 
nature  of  the  evidence  in  favor  of  an  after-life.    Some  men 
find  in  man's  moral  nature  satisfactory  proofs  of  immor- 
tality.    Others  find  the  evidence  insufficient  and  unsatis- 
factory.   This  much  is  certain,  however.    Some  myster- 
ious power,  which  for  convenience  we  have  called  nature 
in  this  essay,  is  shaping  man's  nature  in  a  marvelous  way, 
so  as  to  adapt  him  more  fully  for  social  life.    The  human 
sentiments,  and  particularly  the  altruistic  and  sympathe- 
tic sentiments  have  always  played  and  will  always  con- 
tinue  to  play  a  very  important  part  in  the  development 
of  the  human  race.    One  of  the  objects  of  this  essay  has 
been  to  discover  just  what  part  the  involuntary  part  of 
man's  nature  and  what  part  his  intelligence  plays  in  the 
matter  of  conduct.    Our  conclusion  was,  that  the  province 
of  intelligence    tends  constantly  to  encroach  upon  the 
domain  of  the  emotions.    But  we  also  found  that  certain 
emotions,  by  their  very  nat.ure  were  safe  against  the  en- 
croachments  of  intelligence  and  that  as  to  these  emotions, 
to-wlt:  the  altruistic,  there  is  a  tendency  toward  their 


coincidence  with  the  dictates  of  intelligence.  When  this 
point  is  reached  man's  character  will  have  become  ideal. 
Whether  such  a  character  is  destined  by  nature  to  fit 
man  for  the  earthly  life  alone  or  for  a  larger,  broader, 
higher  sphere  of  activity  is  a  question  which  the  writer 
will  leave  to  the  reader's  own  further  consideration. 
From  the  stand-point  of  Hedonism,  the  earthly  life,  even 
if  we  concede  that  in  some  cases  it  is  not  under  the  present 
regime,  will  in  the  course  of  time  become  valuable  in  itself 
to  humanity.  In  the  mean  time,  ethics  must  ever  remain 
the  queen  of  all  sciences.  In  the  scale  of  interest  and  im- 
portance, ethics  must  ever  rank  above  all  the  other  intel- 
lectual  inquiries  of  the  scholar.  But  in  thus  speaking  of 
ethics,  it  must  be  taken  to  include  the  whole  problem  of 
human  destiny. 


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